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"Under Color of"What Does It Mean?
by Richard H.W. Maloy*
I.

INTRODUCTION

After reading the cases dealt with in this Article, I am reminded of the
story of the old lady who lived on a hammock in the Everglades. Two
census takers rowed out to her abode one day to obtain her statistics.
When she asked them why they were there, they answered that they
were trying to find out how many people live in the United States.
'You've come to the wrong place," she declared. "Why do you say that?"
they asked. "Cause I don't know," was her response. If one is reading
this article to find out the meaning of "under color of" you have come to
the wrong place; Cause I don't know.
Perhaps that statement is not quite correct, for I do know the meaning
of "under color of" as that phrase is used in the Civil Rights Acts. The
phrase "under color of" means the same thing as "state action" of

* Visiting Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law. Dartmouth College
(A.B., 1949); Columbia University School of Law (J.D., 1953); University of Miami (LL.M.,
1974).
I want to thank my research assistant, Sylvia Scott, Senior Articles Editor, St. Thomas
Law Review, for her invaluable help in the preparation of this Article; Associate Dean
Gordon Russell, Charleston School of Law; Brian Williams, International Law Reference
Librarian, San Diego Legal Research Center; Roy Balleste, Head of Public Services, St.
Thomas School of Law; and Ned Swanner, Faculty Services Librarian, St. Thomas School
of Law, for their checking the accuracy of my history of the Civil Rights Acts.
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Fourteenth Amendment' lineage.2 But that begs the question: What
does "state action" mean?3 This Article explores both questions.
The Article searches for the meaning of "under color of" as that phrase
is used in the statutes (specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 242), 4 which impose civil and criminal penalties, respectively, for those
who act "under color of"5 authority of the sovereign and for "state
action" as that term is used in the cases applying Fourteenth Amendment protections. Some courts proclaim that "under color of" is a term
of art used by Congress to differentiate those statutes that proscribe

1. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
2. The Supreme Court has said many times that the two have the same meaning.
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53 n.9 (1992); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 28 (1991);
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 182 n.4 (1988); Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838
(1982); Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 562 (1974); United States v. Price,
383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966); and United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). See
also Justice Brennan's dissent in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 210 (1970), but
in which he later qualified his observation by saying that "the statutory term 'under color
action."'"
of any statute has a narrower meaning than the constitutional concept of "state
Id. at 211. On balance Justice Brennan recognized the identity. In his dissent in Blum
v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1012-13 (1982), he referred to "state action" being present in a
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
3. Because the Fourteenth Amendment "is directed at the States, it can be violated only
by conduct that may be fairly characterized as 'state action.'" Lugar,457 U.S. at 924. The
Supreme Court, as early as 1880, said that the action of a state official who exceeds the
limits of his authority constitutes state action contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1880). The Civil Rights Acts, 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however, deal with infringement of federal rights by other than
private persons except when those private persons act "under color of" or engage in "state
action." See infra note 5.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 158-276 for a discussion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
18 U.S.C. § 242.
5. There is considerable variety in the phrasing of the term "under color of" in the
statutes and cases. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739-40 (2002) ("under color of
law"); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273,277 n.1 (2002) ("under color of state law"); Corr.
Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 62 (2001) ("under color of federal law"); United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 605 (2000) ("under color of any statute"); United States v.
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 n.3 (1997) ("under color of any law"); Morse v. Republican Party
of Virginia, 517 U.S. 186, 265 (1996) ("under authority of the state"); Brower v. County of
Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 593 (1989); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981); Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 1 (1980) ("under color of state statute"); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 155 (1978) ("under color of statute"); Adickes, 398 U.S. at 145 ("under color of
custom"); Adickes, 398 U.S. at 161 ("under color of any custom"); Classic, 313 U.S. at 326
(the wrongdoer is "clothed with authority of state law"); Jackson v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 484 S.W.2d 315, 316 (1972) ("under color of law and custom"). Justice Thomas
dissented saying that "[slection 1983's coverage reasonably extends beyond official
enactments of the State, since it expressly provides for coverage of persons who act under
authority of the State." Morse, 517 U.S. at 265 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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unconstitutional behavior by entities other than private persons. The
concomitant principle to this jurisprudence is that the "private" person
has a constitutional right to discriminate to the full extent of a person's
will.6 As the United States Supreme Court stated in Edmonson v.
7
Leesville Concrete Co.,
"[w]ith a few exceptions, such as the provisions
Amendment,
constitutional guarantees of individual
of the Thirteenth
do
not apply to the actions of private
liberty and equal protection
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 9 18 U.S.C.
the
purpose
entities."' Therefore,
§ 242,1" and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 is to prevent the sovereign
from depriving persons of their rights. The statutes and the constitutional amendment are "no shield against merely private conduct ....
The purpose of the statutory term "under color of" and the phrase "state
action," as used by the courts, is to prevent private deprivation from
going uninhibited by tying the person who does the depriving, the "state
actor," to the sovereign.
This Article does not consider the intriguing question of what is the
"law" of "under color of law."13 Nor does the Article examine why some
statutes proscribing unconstitutional behavior do not contain the "under
color of" legend. 4 In addition, the Article does not consider statutes

6. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 83
(1932) (reaffirming the distinction between private and state action brought out in the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)).
7. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
8. Id. at 619. See also NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988); FlaggBros., 436
U.S. at 156; Gilmore, 417 U.S. at 575.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 242.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
12. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 13. See also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
13. That could be the subject of another paper. Examples of such intriguing questions:
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (considering whether President Nixon was
required to comply with a subpoena, commanding him to produce tape recordings of his
conversations with aides); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(determining whether President Truman exceeded his constitutional authority when he
issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most
of the nation's steel mills in order to avert a national catastrophe); United States v. Burr,
25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14, 692d) (considering whether the "President of the
United States" could be served with a subpeona duces tecum in the treason trial of Aaron
Burr).
14. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1982. See infra text accompanying note 35 (dealing with Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)).
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and 18 U.S.C. § 242, which contain the
other than 42 U.S.C. § 51983
s
phrase "under color of."
The Article is not primarily concerned with cases in which the person
accused of discrimination is a police officer or some other employee of a
public body 16 acting in the course of their official duties.17 Such cases
are discussed," of course, as they form part of the great, but unheralded debate in the law as to whether there are two meanings of "under
color of," i.e., acts performed by persons in their official capacity or acts
performed by persons acting in "pretense of the law." 9
In Part II the genesis of the subject civil rights statutes is reviewed.2 °
Part III examines the anatomy of those statutes. Part IV presents the
United States Supreme Court's recent decisions concerning "under color
of" and "state action." The Conclusion attempts to summarize the work
of this lexology.
II.

THE GENESIS OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983 AND 18 U.S.C. § 242

On April 9, 1865, a tall general officer of the Army of Northern
Virginia, in full dress uniform with sash and jeweled sword, met a short
general officer of the United States Army, dressed in private's blouse
and trousers tucked into muddy boots. The meeting occurred in the
home of Wilmer McLean at Appomattox Courthouse, Virginia. General
Robert E. Lee surrendered his forces to General Ulysses S. Grant.2 '
What now? Well, now the war of rebellion22 was virtually over,23 but

15. See 42 U.S.C. § 1971; 42 U.S.C. § 1973(i); 42 U.S.C. § 13981; Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(b)(2); The Judiciary Act of 1789, sec. 14, 1 Stat. 82; sec. 20, 35 Stat. 1092 ("under
color of official right"). Nor is the Article concerned with statutes, i.e., 35 Stat. 1092, no
longer in existence that contained the phrase.
16. Such cases may be considered, but only tangentially, i.e., for some principle other
than the meaning of "under color of." In 1994 Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which
contained the phrase "under color of," but in 2000 the Supreme Court declared it
unconstitutional because it exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619. The statute was not saved by Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 626.
17. See Belcher v. Stengel, 429 U.S. 118, 119 (1976) (concerning this distinction).
18. Principally in Part II of the Article.
19. See infra Part III.A of the Article in which Justice Frankfurter's participation in
this debate is recognized.
20. The history of the origin of the Civil Rights Acts is important because the opinions
of the Supreme Court cases analyzed herein often discuss it.
21.

JAMES M. McPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 849 (Oxford University Press

1988).
22. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 68 (1872). The opinion was actually
delivered on April 14, 1873. Justice William 0. Douglas referred to it as "the Nation's most
critical internal conflict." United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 87 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
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at that moment, there were four million people 24 living in the southeastern part of the United States who had a new status. What were
they to do with it? One author described what they did with it in these
words:
When the enslaved Negroes were informed by their masters or by
Federal agents or by rumor that they were free, their most general and
immediate response to the news was to pick up and leave the home
place to go somewhere else. Thus to the Negro just released from
slavery,2" freedom meant, first of all, the right to move. He changed
his name and wandered away from the plantation. 6
Because the President who led his nation to victory was assassinated
just seven days after the surrender at Appomattox, 27 and the presence
of twenty million still hostile former "rebels" led to confrontations, the
new freedom granted to four million men, women, and children who were
on the move was far less than what might have been hoped for. The
United States Supreme Court stated the plight of the "freedmen" in the
following words:
They were in some States forbidden to appear in the towns in any
other character than menial servants. They were required to reside on
and cultivate the soil without the right to purchase or own it. They
were excluded from many occupations of gain, and were not permitted
to give testimony in the courts in any case where a white man was a
party. It was said that their lives were at the mercy of bad men, either
because the laws for their protection were insufficient or were not
enforced.

dissenting).
23. It did not end, in fact, until seventeen days later when Confederate General Joseph
E. Johnston surrendered his force to General William T. Sherman at Durham Station,
North Carolina. ROY T. NICHOLS, THE STAKES OF POWER 156 (Hill & Wang 1961).
24. Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. at 68 (establishing the former slave population at
four million persons). See also Price, 383 U.S. at 808.
25. President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation of January 1, 1863, freed them in
name only.
26. HENDERSON H. DONALD,THE NEGRO FREEDMAN 1 (Henry Schuman 1952). The
author continues:
[n]ot a few of the freedmen were prompted to take to the road because they feared
they might be re-enslaved if they remained where they were. This was
particularly true of the elderly Negroes, who appeared to be somewhat dazed by
their freedom and were at a loss to determine its full scope.
Id. at 2.
27. President Lincoln was mortally wounded by Booth's weaponry on the evening of
April 14, 1865, and lingered unconscious until 7:25 a.m. the following morning when he
expired.
28. Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. at 70.
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On March 3, 1865, President Lincoln signed the Freedmen's Bureau
Act of 1865 creating a Bureau of Freedmen, Refugees, and Abandoned
Lands.2 9 The Bureau was "designed to see to it that the ex-slaves were
established in their freedom so that they would have a real chance to
care for themselves and learn social and economic independence."30
This was a tall order because the United States Supreme Court in the
Dred Scott decision 31 had "delineated the constitutional
32 community as
more narrowly drawn than the territorial community."
The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States 33 was proposed to the legislatures of the thirty-six states by the
Ratification was
Thirty-Eighth Congress on January 31, 1865.
18, 1865, the
on
December
and
6,
1865,
on
December
completed
of the
twenty-seven
that
proclamation
in
a
reported
Secretary of State
34 The Thiramendment.
the
proposed
ratified
had
thirty-six states
teenth Amendment declared that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary
place
servitude ... shall exist within the United States, or any
35

..

under their jurisdiction, except as punishment for a crime.
Soon after the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment and exactly
one year after Appomattox, Congress passed the first of several Civil
Rights bills to come before the legislature, known as the Civil Rights Act
of April 9, 1866.36 Section 2 of the Act, the first of the Civil Rights Acts
29. 44 U.S.C. § 2910 (2000).
30. NICHOLS, supra note 23, at 163.
31. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
32. See Annie M. Chan, Community and the Constitution:A Reassessment of the Roots
of Immigration Law, 21 VT. L. REV. 491, 494 (Winter 1996). Professor Chan writes:
"Native Americans and African Americans existed in a perpetual state of 'noncitizenship,'
that is, a constitutional vacuum." Id. at 494-95. In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539
(1842), perhaps jurisprudentially more important than the Dred Scott case (see Paul
Finkelman, Priggv. Pennsylvania UnderstandingJustice Story's Proslavery Nationalism,
2 J. SUPREME CT. HIST. 51, 54 (1997)), the Court, upholding the constitutionality of the
1793 Fugitive Slave Law, held that Pennsylvania's personal liberty law was unconstitutional and recognized a federal common law of an owner's right to recapture "runaway" slaves.
Prigg, 41 U.S. at 540-41.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
34. U.S.CONST. amend. XIII, Historical Notes (1987).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (preventing discrimination
against people in the purchase or rental of property because of their race or color, passed
by Congress under the authority of the Thirteenth Amendment). See Jones, 392 U.S. at
438-39.
36. Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). On March 15, 1866, the bill was sent to

President Johnson, who vetoed the bill after holding it for ten days. On April 6, 1866, the
Senate overrode the veto 33 to 15, and on April 9, 1866, the House overrode it 122 to 41;
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 became law. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S.
701, 719 (1989). It has been opined that this statute was passed under the "sanction" of
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to contain "under color of,"3 7 was a criminal statute, and hence, the
precursor to the present 18 U.S.C. § 242. Section 2 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 provided that:
[A]ny person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant
of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or
protected by this act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on
account of such person having at any time been held in a condition of
slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or by reason of his
color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of white persons,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ...

..

The Supreme Court in Blyew v. United States,39 explained the raison
d'etre of the Act. Justice William Strong wrote:
We cannot be expected to be ignorant of the condition of things which
existed when the statute was enacted, or of the evils which it was
intended to remedy. It is well known that in many of the States, laws
existed which subjected colored men convicted of criminal offences to
punishments different from and often severer than those which were
inflicted upon white persons convicted of similar offenses. The modes
of trial were also different, and the right of trial by jury was sometimes
denied them. It is also well known that in many quarters prejudices
existed against the colored race, which naturally affected the administration of justice in the State courts, and operated harshly when one
of the race was a party accused. These were evils doubtless which the
act of Congress had in view, and which it intended to remove. And so
far as it reaches, it extends to both races the same rights, and the same
means of vindicating them.4"
The Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866," was re-enacted on May 31,
1870.42 On April 20, 1871, Congress added civil penalties by enacting
the Ku Klux Klan Act.43

the Thirteenth Amendment. See Jackson v. State, 103 A. 910, 910 (Md. 1918).
37. Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, § 2.
38. Id. (reenacted as act on May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140).
39. 80 U.S. 581 (1871).
40. Id. at 593. For another of Justice Strong's histories of the amendment, see
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1879).
41. Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
42. 16 Stat. 140. For a history of the Act, see MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E.
KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION § 1.1 (3d ed. 1997); SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS
LIBERTIES LITIGATION 1.03 (3d ed. 1991).

43. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). See also infra text accompanying
notes 65-72.

572

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
was proposed to the legislatures of the thirty-seven states by the same
session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress that passed the Civil Rights Bill of
1866." Ratification was completed on July 9, 1868, and on July 28,
1868, the Secretary of State reported in a certificate that twenty-eight
of the thirty-seven states had ratified the amendment.45 The first
section of the amendment declared that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside [and]
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law"46 which abridges their
privileges or immunities,47 their due process rights," or equal protection of the laws.4 9 This first section made certain that the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 was constitutionally sound and that even if some future
Congress were to repeal it, those basic rights of citizenship, privileges
and immunities, due process, and equal protection would be constitutionally protected.5"
On March 2, 1867, the Anti-Peonage Act51 was enacted into law by
Congress. It sought to eliminate a form of peonage prevailing in the
territory of New Mexico as a result of Spanish rule, but the Act was also
used to prevent anyone from holding another in involuntary servitude
throughout the United States.
Despite a congressional drumbeat strengthening federal protection
against discrimination, the United States Supreme Court, in several
decisions, began to weaken this protection. The first sign of such an

44. See supra text accompanying notes 35-42.
45. Act of July 28, 1868, 15 Stat. 708.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This constituted an overruling of Scott v. Sanford,
60 U.S. 393 (1856). See supra text accompanying notes 28-32.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
48. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Constitution as originally drafted and ratified
had no equal protection provision. "This, of course, is not surprising for a document
written for a society where blacks were enslaved and where women were routinely
discriminated against." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES § 9.1.1 (1997).
50. See Perkins v. ELG, 307 U.S. 325, 328-29 (1939). Shortly after the enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress, "evidently thinking it unwise, and perhaps unsafe,
to leave so important a declaration of rights to depend upon an ordinary act of legislation,
which might be repealed by any subsequent [Clongress, framed the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution." United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 675 (1898). See also
Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 507 (1939); Eugene Gressman, The History of the Civil
Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1331 (1952).
51. 14 Stat. 546 (1867).
52. Gressman, supra note 50, at 1328.
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attack on federal dominance, though perhaps not recognized at the time,
was the 1868 decision in Paul v. Virginia5 3 in which the Court declared
a Virginia statute, which required licensing for out-of-state insurance
carriers, constitutional.54 The rationale was that corporations were not
"citizens" within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the Federal Constitution. 55 In dictum,5 6 almost as an appendage to
the opinion, the Court by implication stated that any protection against
was to originate with the states rather than the federal
discrimination
57
government.
The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States s
was proposed to the legislatures of the thirty-seven states by the
Fortieth Congress on February 26, 1869." s Ratification was completed
on February 3, 1870,0 and on March 30, 1870, the Secretary of State
reported in a proclamation that twenty-nine of the thirty-seven states
had ratified the amendment. 61 The Fifteenth Amendment declared that
the right of citizens to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude."
On May 31, 1870, shortly after the ratification of the Fifteenth
Amendment, the Forty-First Congress passed an act to enforce citizens'
right to vote; hence the "Enforcement Act" 3 provided, inter alia, that
all citizens of the United States, otherwise qualified, shall be allowed to
vote at all elections "without distinction of race, color, or previous ...
servitude." The sixth section provided:
If two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go in
disguise upon the public highway, or upon the premises of another,
with intent to violate any provision of this act, or to injure, oppress,

53. 75 U.S. 168 (1868).
54.

Act of Virginia Legislature, passed on Feb. 3, 1866.

55. Paul, 75 U.S. at 181.
56. The primary purpose of the clause was to help fuse into one nation a collection of
independent sovereign states. It was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who
ventures into State B the same privileges that the citizens of State B enjoy. For protection
of such equality the citizen of State A was not to be restricted to the uncertain remedies
afforded by diplomatic processes and official retaliation. Id. at 180.
57. Id. at 181.
58. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
59. No. 10, 16 Stat. 1131, 1131-32 (1870).
60. Titles 1-5, U.S.C. §§ 64, 64-65 (2000).
61. 16 Stat. at 1131-32.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.

63. Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, 140-46 (1870) (amended slightly by the Act of February 28,
1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433).
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threaten, or intimidate any citizen with intent to prevent or hinder his
free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured
to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of
his having exercised the same, such persons shall be held guilty of
felony ....
[Sections 16, 17, and 18 of the Enforcement Act reenacted the Civil
Rights Act of April 9, 1866. 64]
On April 20, 1871, the Forty-Second Congress enacted the third Civil
Rights Act known as the Ku Klux Klan Act.65 The primary purpose of
the Act was to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.66
Section 1 of the Act added civil remedies to the criminal sanctions
contained in the Civil Rights Act of 186667 for the deprivation of rights
by an officer "under color of law."6 8 Thus, Section 1 of the Ku Klux
Klan Act was the precursor of the present day 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
President was given power to suppress violence by "a provision which
was specifically directed against lynching and other forms of mob
violence. " 6

On June 22, 1874, the statute became § 1979 of Title 24 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States,70 and upon adoption of the United States
Code on June 30, 1926, the statute became § 43 of Title 8 of the United
States Code.71 In 1952 the statute was transferred 7to2 § 1983 of Title
42 of the United States Code, where it remains today.
On April 14, 1873, the United States Supreme Court deftly continued
the weakening of federal protection against discrimination, which could

64. Id. at 141. See supra note 36. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 n.7 (1948). The Act
was amended on February 28, 1871 by a number of procedural and substantive changes,
the most noteworthy of which was to permanently stay all proceedings in state courts
under the Act. Id. at 439.
65. Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). It became positive law of the United States as part
of the Revised Statutes Act of 1874.
66. For a history of the Act see the excellent article by David Achtenberg, A Milder
Measure of Villany: The Unknown History of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Meaning of "Under
Color of" Law, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 1 (1999).
67. 17 Stat. at 13. See supra note 43.
68. The Act was passed "for the express purpose of 'enforc[ing] the Provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment."' 17 Stat. at 13. It was entitled "An Act to Enforce the Provisions
of the Fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States and for other
Purposes." Id. See Jett,491 U.S. at 722; Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 545
(1972).
69. Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L.
REV. 1323, 1334 (1952).
70. 18, Part 1 Stat. 347 (1874).
71. Codifications, 8 U.S.C. § 43 (1926). See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157,
161 (1943); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 273 n.4 (1939).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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have been predicted by its decision in Paul v. Virginia.73 A majority
opinion of five Justices, written by Justice Miller in the Slaughter-House
Cases,74 proclaimed that a Louisiana statute of March 8, 1864, creating
a corporate monopoly for the purpose of slaughtering animals in New
Orleans, passed constitutional muster.7" From the facts it is difficult
to discern civil rights implications. The Court singled out the police
power as its reason for finding the Louisiana statute valid. 6 Beneath
this rationale lies the case's impact upon civil rights. The Court had to
contend, inter alia,7 with the argument supported by almost fifty years
of precedent" that the monopoly offended the privileges and immunities of the New Orleans butchers who were not a part of the monopoly.79 Justice Miller, however, stated that even though the Fourteenth
Amendment gave national citizenship to Louisiana citizens, and even
though Article IV,Section 2 of the United States Constitution ° assured
those citizens that fundamental privileges and immunities could not be
taken away by the states, national citizenship did not confer such
fundamental privileges and immunities.8" Except for a few restrictions
upon the States (for example, the prohibition against ex post facto laws,
bills of attainder, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts), "the
entire domain of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States,
as above defined, lay within the constitutional and legislative power of
the States, and without that of the Federal government." 2 Though the
case had no direct civil rights implications, Justice Miller's opinion
described these fundamental privileges and immunities as "civil

73. Paul, 75 U.S. at 168. See supra text accompanying note 56.
74. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
75. Id. at 66.
76. Id. at 62.
77. The other constitutional arguments were involuntary servitude, equal protection,
and due process. Id. at 66.
78. Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington, forty-nine years earlier sitting in
circuit in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823), wrote that the right "to acquire
and possess property of every kind" was a fundamental privilege and immunity, id. at 551,
a subject of the Articles of Confederation and later incorporated into article IV, section 2
of the Constitution. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 75-76.
79. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 77-78.
80. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
81. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 78-79. Sixty-six years later in Hague, Justice
Harlan Fiske Stone described this fact in the following words, "[tihe privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, it was pointed out, are confined to that limited
class of interests growing out of the relationship between the citizen and the national
government created by the Constitution and federal laws." 307 U.S. at 520 n.1.
82. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 77.
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rights.""8 Hence, from April 14, 1873 forward, the power to protect
such civil rights as the privilege and immunity "to acquire and possess
property of every kind" had to be found in state law because they were
not protected under federal law.8 4 This rule of law has never been
changed.
On March 1, 1875, Congress enacted a "Civil Rights Act."8 5 Section
1 of the statute provided that:
[All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be
entitled to the full and equal and enjoyment of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on
land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject
only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and
applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any
previous condition of servitude.8 '
Section 2 provided penalties for the breach of Section 1.1 7 Section 3
gave the district and circuit courts of the United States, exclusive of the
courts of the individual states, cognizance of all violations of the Act. 8
Section 4 declared that:
[N]o citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be
prescribed by law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit
juror in any court of the United States, or of any State, on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude; and any officer or other
person charged with any duty in the selection or summoning of jurors
who shall exclude or fail to summon any citizen for the cause aforesaid
shall .

.

. be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .

9

83. Id. at 77-78.
84. Id. at 76. So as to leave no doubt that some privileges and immunities were
protected by federal law, the Court specifically mentioned: the right to travel to the seat
of government to assert claims, free access to the seaports and courts of justice in the
several states, the right of peaceful assembly and petition for redress of grievances, the
privilege of habeas corpus, the right to become a citizen of any state by mere residence and
to have the same rights as citizens thereof, the rights of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, and the Due Process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 79-80. Whether these privileges and immunities were singled out
because they had greater weight than the "civil rights" the Court did not say.
85. Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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Section 5 gave the United States Supreme Court the power of review
over all cases arising under the Act without regard to the amount
involved.90
During its October 1875 term, the Supreme Court made a ruling that
explicitly chipped away at Congress's attempt to protect against
discrimination. 91 In United States v. Reese,92 a federal criminal
prosecution involved two Kentucky municipal election inspectors who
were charged with violation of the Enforcement Act of 18709' for failing
to permit a black man to vote.94 The Court held that the Enforcement
Act unconstitutionally exceeded Congress's power under the Fifteenth
Amendment because it was too broad; under the Act's provisions, an
election official could be prosecuted for disenfranchising "free white
citizens," whereas the Fifteenth Amendment was meant to protect
against only disenfranchisement of "colored" citizens.95
Also during the October 1875 term, the Court in United States v.
Cruikshank96 severely restricted the right of peaceful assembly. The97
conviction of two men under the sixth section of the Enforcement Act
was reversed because the indictment failed to allege that defendants
sought to prevent men of African descent from assembling for "a redress
of grievances, or for any thing else connected with the powers or the
duties of the national government.""8 Even though the Court in the

90. Id.
91. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
92. 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
93. See supra text accompanying note 64.
94. Under the third and fourth sections of the Enforcement Act (at the time of the
decision, Revised Statutes 2007, 2008, and 5506), it was an offense for any judge, inspector,
or other officer of election whose duty it was, under the circumstances therein stated, to
receive and count the vote of any citizen or to wrongfully refuse to receive and count the
same. It was also an offense for any person, by force, bribery, or other offense, to hinder
or delay any citizen from doing any act required to be done to qualify them to vote or from
voting in any election. Section 3-4, 16 Stat. at 140-41.
95. Reese, 92 U.S. at 221-22.
96. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
97. Section 6, 16 Stat. at 141. The section provided that:
[I]f two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go in disguise upon the
public highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to violate any
provision of this act, or to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen with
intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or
privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or because of his having exercised the same, such persons shall be held
guilty of felony ....

Id.
98.

Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552-53.
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Slaughter-HouseCases stated by dictum that interference with the right
of assembly was an indictable offense,99 the Court in Cruikshank
established that unless the assembly is100for the limited purpose of
redressing a grievance, it is not protected.
During the October 1877 term, the United States Supreme Court
considered a Louisiana statute, enacted on February 23, 1869, which
required that all engaged in interstate commerce give "equal rights and
privileges in all parts of the conveyance, without distinction or discrimiIn Hall v. Decuir,10 2 the Sunation on account of race or color."1 '
preme Court struck down the statute that violated the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution. °3 "A passenger in the cabin set apart for the use
of whites without the State must, when the boat comes within, share the
accommodations of that cabin with such colored persons as may come on
board afterwards, if the law is enforced."1 0 4 This, the Court concluded,
would "be productive of great inconvenience and unnecessary hardship."10 5
During the October 1879 term, the Supreme Court in Virginia v.
Rives 116 held that while the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that
members of the "colored" race may not be excluded from a jury to pass
upon a "colored" person's life, liberty, or property, it does not guarantee
that their jury will consist, at least in part, of "colored" people, i.e., that

99. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79-80.
100. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552-53. In words which leave no doubt as to their import:
The equality of the rights of citizens is a principle of republicanism. Every
republican government is in duty bound to protect all its citizens in the enjoyment
of this principle, if within its power. That duty was originally assumed by the
States; and it still remains there. The only obligation resting upon the United
States is to see that the States do not deny the right. This the [Fourteenth]
[A]mendment guarantees, but no more. The power of the national government is
limited to the enforcement of this guaranty.
Id. at 555.
101. Hall v. Decuir, 95 U.S. 485, 487 (1877).
102. Id. at 485.
103. Id. at 490.
104. Id. at 489. The Court continuing:
The river Mississippi passes through or along the borders of ten different States,
and its tributaries reach many more. The commerce upon these waters is
immense, and its regulation clearly a matter of a national concern. If such State
was at liberty to regulate the conduct of carriers while within its jurisdiction, the
confusion likely to follow could not be productive of great inconvenience and
unnecessary hardship.
Id.
105. Id.
106. 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
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there will be at least one person of his own race on the trial jury of an

accused.107
During that same October 1879 term, the Supreme Court in Ex parte
Virginia0 8 appears to have turned the corner in its prior weakening
of civil rights protection. It approved the indictment of a state judge for
restricting jury service to members of the Caucasian race even though
the state had no statute containing such restriction.' °9 The basis of
the conviction was the fourth section of the Civil Rights Act of March 1,
1875," 0 which provided that no person shall be disqualified as a grand
or petit juror because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."' In referring to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,
the Court added gratuitously that "[t]hey were intended to be, what they
really are, limitations of the powers of the States and enlargements of
the power of Congres[s].""'
The Court stated that the actions of state officers who exceed the
limits of their authority constitute the Fourteenth Amendment's "state
action" requirement," 3 making it clear that "state action" is not
restricted to acts of the legislature." 4 The decision also echoed a ring

107. Id. at 322-23.
It is a right to which every colored man is entitled, that, in the selection of jurors
to pass upon his life, liberty, or property, there shall be no exclusion of his race,
and no discrimination against them because of their color. But this is a different
thing from the right which it is asserted was denied to the petitioners by the State
court, viz. a right to have the jury composed in part of colored men. A mixed jury
in a particular case is not essential to the equal protection of the laws, and the
right to it is not given by any law of Virginia, or by any Federal statute. It is not,
therefore, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment ....
Id.
108. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
109. Id. at 349.
110. 18 Stat. 335.
111. Id. Whether or not the state laid down any rule of disqualification did not matter
when the disqualification resulted from the acts of a state officer or agent. Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. at 346.
112. Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345.
113. Id. at 346-47.
114. This point was made clear by Justice Brandeis in Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust &
Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680 (1930), when he wrote that "[t]he federal guaranty
of due process extends to state action through its judicial as well as through its legislative,
executive, or administrative branch of government."
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of the pretense definition of the term "under color of."115 This pronouncement was a prediction of rulings to follow.11
On January 22, 1883, the Supreme Court in United States v.
7 returned to its restrictive mode. The Court declared part of
Harris".
the Ku Klux Klan Act,' 18 Section 5519 of the Revised Statutes, unconstitutional.1 9 Under this section, a lynch mob was indicted for seizing
prisoners being held by a state deputy sheriff. 20 The Court immediately rejected the Fifteenth Amendment because that Amendment
"merely invests citizens of the United States with the constitutional
right of exemption from discrimination in the enjoyment of the elective
franchise on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."1 2 '

The Thirteenth Amendment simply prohibited slavery and

involuntary servitude.'22 As to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
reiterated its position that the amendment prohibited state action but
did not touch the actions of private persons.'23 Justice William B.
Woods, writing for the Court, stated:
[Tihe section of the law under consideration is directed exclusively
against the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of
the states, or their administration by the officers of the state, we are
by any clause in the
clear in the opinion that it is not warranted
24
fourteenth amendment to the constitution.1
On October 15, 1883, in the Civil Rights Cases,'25 the Supreme
Court declared Sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875

115. See supra text accompanying note 19 and infra text accompanying notes 404-06,
413, 432, and 738.
116. In Shelley the Court defined "state action" as "exertions of state power in all
forms. And when the effect of that action is to deny rights subject to the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it is the obligation of this Court to enforce the constitutional
commands." 334 U.S. at 20.
117. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
118. Section 5519 of the Revised Statutes was originally a part of Section 2 of the Ku
Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. at 13-14. See Harris, 106 U.S. 629. See supra
notes 65-72 regarding the Ku Klux Klan Act.
119. Harris, 106 U.S. at 632-33.
120. Id. at 644.
121. Id. at 637 (citing Reese, 92 U.S. at 218).
122. Id. at 641.
123. Id. at 640.
124. Id.
125. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Though designated "The Civil Rights Cases" by the Court, the
decision involved an action by the United States against four individuals for violation of
the Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875, and an action by one married couple against the
Memphis & Charleston Railroad for refusing the wife, who was of African descent, to ride
in its ladies' car.
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unconstitutional. 12 Ostensibly, it was the state-action principle of the
Slaughter-House Cases27 that carried the day even though that case
was not mentioned by the majority. 128 Referring to the Fourteenth
Amendment, Justice Bradley stated that: "It is state action of a
particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual
rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment."'2 9 Because the
questioned statute "does not profess to be corrective of any constitutional
wrong committed by the states,"3 ° it did not pass constitutional
muster.' 3' The original Civil Rights Bill of 1866132 was analyzed and
determined to be constitutional because it was corrective legislation."3
The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were compared, and both
amendments were determined to be "self-executing without any ancillary
legislation." 134 However, if there was legislation under the Thirteenth
Amendment, it may be "direct and primary,""135 but "[t]he fourteenth
amendment extends its protection to races and classes, and prohibits any
state legislation which has the effect of denying to any race or class, or
to any individual, the equal protection of the laws."" 6 This is the
Slaughter-House doctrine.
As to what might have been the real reason for the decision, and
certainly its coup de grace to any chance of concluding that the disputed
sections were constitutional, the Court stated:
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it
apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make
as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into
his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theater, or deal with
in other matters of intercourse or business. 137
As reason for those words the majority approved of the following
statement:

126. Id. at 25. See supra note 85.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 74-84.
128. Curiously, the majority opinion referred to Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, Rives, 100
U.S. 313, and Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, but only the dissenting Justices mentioned
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36.
129. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
130. Id. at 14.
131. Id. at 11.
132. See supra text accompanying note 36.
133. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 16-18.
134. Id. at 20.
135. Id. at 23.
136. Id. at 24.
137. Id. at 24-25.
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When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state,
there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he
takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite
of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be
protected in the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are
protected. 3
That rather deprecating statement prompted Justice Harlan to write
in dissent:
It is, I submit, scarcely just to say that the colored race has been the
special favorite of the laws. What the nation, through congress, has
sought to accomplish in reference to that race is, what had already
been done in every state in the Union for the white race, to secure and
protect139 rights belonging to them as freemen and citizens; nothing
more.
Thus, eighteen years after the end of the Civil War, it was apparent
that the Supreme Court was not in agreement on the proper method of
protecting people against discrimination.
In Plessy v. Ferguson140 on May 18, 1896, the United States Supreme
Court held constitutional an 1890 Louisiana statute mandating separate
but equal accommodations in railroad cars.' 4 ' Reflecting some of the
impatience found in the Civil Rights Cases.4 with plaintiff's argument
to the effect that forcing blacks into separate areas stigmatized them,
the majority opinion, 14 ' authored by Justice Henry B. Brown, stated:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist
in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps
the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by
reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it.'"

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 25.
Id. at 61 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-51.
See supra note 124.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 551.
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To summarize, Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866,145
a criminal statute, 146 was reenacted by the Enforcement Act of May 31,
1870,17 making it applicable to "any inhabitant of any State or
Territory." Section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871,148
reenacted the original Civil Rights Act of 1866 and authorized civil suits
for the redress of any wrongs. 149 When the Revised Statutes were
adopted in 1874-1878,15o the criminal statute became R.S. 5510 but
was repealed by the Act of March 4, 1909,151 and replaced by Section
20 thereof,112 which was later codified as 18 U.S.C. § 52113 and ultimately renumbered to its present 18 U.S.C. § 242.5 The civil statute
became Section 1979 of the Revised Statutes;155 then on June 30, 1926,

145. Ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
146. It provided that the perpetrator shall be "guilty of a misdemeanor, and on
conviction, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment,
not exceeding one year, in the discretion of the court." Id. In addition to prohibiting
deprivation of rights, the Act abrogated any:
different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person having at any
time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as
punishment for crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or by
reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of white persons.
Id.
147. Ch. 114, § 17, 16 Stat. 144 (1870).
148. Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
149. It incorporated the civil remedies portion of the 1866 Act into a new section that
contained the words "shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage
of the State to the contrary notwithstanding ..,"all of which was eliminated by 8 U.S.C.
§ 43. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 98-100 (1945). See infra note 396.
150. "On June 22, 1874, the First Session of the Forty-Third Congress (1873-74) caused
to be published all federal statutes that were in force on December 1, 1873, as the revised
statutes of the United States, general and permanent in their nature." 18 Rev. Stat. title
page (2d ed. 1875). It did not contain private or temporary acts or laws otherwise not
thought to be of general permanent interest. See MORRIS L. COHEN, ROBERT C. HERRING
& KENT C. OLSON, HOW TO FIND THE LAW, ch. 5, C.4.a. (9th ed. 1989); 14 Stat. 27, as reenacted by 17 Stat. 13, was renumbered as Section 1979 of Title 24 of the Revised Statutes.
On March 2, 1877, a second edition of the Revised Statutes, 19 Stat. 268 appeared.
Revised Statute 1979 was not affected by the revision. Hurd, 334 U.S. at 30 is incorrect
when it refers to § 1979 as § "1978" of the Revised Statutes.
151. Ch. 321, § 341, 35 Stat. 1153-54 (1909).
152. Ch. 321, § 20, 35 Stat. 1092 (1909).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 52 (1940).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000).
155. Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1978).

584

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

it was codified as 8 U.S.C. § 43156 and in 1952 was renumbered as 42
U.S.C. § 1983, its present designation.'57
III.
A.

THE ANATOMY OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983 AND 18 U.S.C. § 242

The Civil Statute-42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983,15 which provides civil remedies for the deprivation of
civil rights, contains the following language:
Every person[" 9 ] who, under color of[ 160] any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage,[ 6 1 ] of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia,[112] subjects, or causes to be subjected,["6 3] any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereofi' ]I to the deprivation['] of any rights, privileges, or immunities[ 66] secured by the Constitution and laws,[ 7] shall be liable
to the party injured in an] action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
....169
proceeding for redress['
Section 1983 contains ten parts: (A) it imposes liability "in an action
at law, suit in equity or other proceeding," (B) upon "every person," (C)
who "under color of," (D) "any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage," (E) "of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia," (F)
"subjects or causes to be subjected," (G) "any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof," (H) "to the deprivation

156. On June 30, 1926, the United States Code was enacted into law by the Sixty-ninth
Congress. Revised Statute 1979 became Section 43 of Title 8 of the United States Code.
In 1934 and 1940, Congress effected certain amendments to the United States Code, but
8 U.S.C. § 43 remained unchanged.
157. See Screws, 325 U.S. at 98-100 (giving a partial history of the Act).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
159. See infra text accompanying notes 175-88.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 189-212.
161. See infra text accompanying notes 213-22. The distinction between 'any statute,
ordinance, regulation" and "custom, usage" would make a fascinating subject of another
paper.
162. See infra text accompanying note 223.
163. See infra text accompanying notes 224-30.
164. See infra text accompanying notes 231-37.
165. See infra text accompanying notes 238-41.
166. See infra text accompanying notes 242-53.
167. See infra text accompanying notes 254-74.
168. See infra text accompanying notes 275-76.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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of," (I) "any rights, privileges, or immunities," and (J) "secured by the
Constitution and laws."7 0
"17
1. "In an Action at Law, Suit in Equity or Other Proceeding ,

Equitable relief, in the form of a mandatory injunction to register
people of African descent as voters, was denied on the ground that "[t]he
traditional limits of proceedings in equity have not embraced a remedy
for political wrongs."' 72 Section 1983 cannot be used to enjoin certain
objectionable operations of a municipal police force when no allegation
of deprivation of constitutional rights exists. 173 An injunction seeking
the cancellation of a private club's liquor
174 license was denied when the
petitioner failed to prove "state action."

2. "Upon 'Every Person"'
a. The United States is not a "person" within the statute, 7 5 but
persons employed by the federal government as "federal officers" may be
sued for violation of another's constitutional rights.'76 Private entities
which177employ people to act "under color of" federal law may not be
sued.

170. Id.
171. Professor Tracy A. Thomas has pointed out that in permitting an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proceeding Congress has created a "narrow statutory exception to
[an] absolute ban" against federal equitable intervention in a pending state court
proceeding "regardless of how extraordinary the particular circumstances may be." See
Tracy A. Thomas, UnderstandingProphylacticRemedies Through the Looking Glass of
Bush v. Gore, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343 (2002).
172. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903) (citing Green v. Mills, 69 F. 852 (1895)).
173. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-79 (1976). But cf. Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 556 (1972), in which the Supreme Court approved of injunctive relief.
The unique nature of the Connecticut attachment/garnishment statute permitted that
remedy without judicial intervention. Because of that, neither § 1983 nor 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(prohibiting federal courts from granting injunctions to stay state court proceedings unless
specifically authorized by an Act of Congress) prohibited an injunction in that case.
174. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972).
175. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 701 n.27 (1979).
176. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 391 n.4 (1971). In Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27, 32 (1991), it was said that "[a]
government official in the role of personal-capacity defendant... fits comfortably within
the statutory term 'person.'"
177. See Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 536 U.S. 61, 61 (2001).
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b. A state is not a "person" within § 1983,' nor do its officials act
in their official capacities when the suit is brought as an "official
capacity" action.17 9 Such officials are "persons" when the suit is
brought as a "personal liability" action. 8 °
c. In 1961 the Supreme Court stated that a municipality was not a
"person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.181 In 1978 the Supreme Court
reversed itself and decided that a municipality is a "person"18 2 within
§ 1983, and hence, can be sued."8 3 Before a municipality may be held
liable under § 1983, however, one must prove not only that the agent of
the municipality was untrained or improperly trained, but that the

178. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989).
179. Id. at 71.
180. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991).
181. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-91 (1961).
182. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). See infra
note 423. The Court did not overrule its earlier pronouncement, to the effect that a
municipality is not a person that can be liable under the statute, but that:
[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely
by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy
or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government
as an entity is responsible under § 1983.
Id. at 694.
In other words, a municipality's § 1983 liability cannot be based upon respondeat
superior. See also Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 734-35 (1989); Board of
County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997), in which it was stated that:
[Ilt is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly
attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that,
through its deliberateconduct, the municipality was the "moving force" behind the
injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken
with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link
between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.
Punitive damages are not recoverable against a municipality. City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
183. Six members of the Court in Monroe had been replaced, and this time the Court
voted seven to two that municipalities were "persons" under § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at
690. Justice Brennan, switching his position from 1961, wrote the majority opinion.
Justice Brennan determined that the mistake of the 1961 Court in Monroe was its analysis
of the legislative history of the 1871 Act. Id. at 669. According to the Court in Monroe,
Congress in 1871 thought that it did not have the power to impose any obligation upon
county and town organizations. Id. at 674-75. Upon an exhaustive analysis of the
legislative history, the Court in Monell held that "Congress did intend municipalities and
other local government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies."
Id. at 690. The Court again made it clear, however, that municipal liability could not be
based on respondeat superior. Id. at 694.

2005]

UNDER COLOR OF

587

deficiencies in training rose to the level of a policy."8 4 This does not
require an overt policy of training improperly but a training program, if
one exists, which is so faulty that it reflects a "deliberately indifferent"
attitude toward the proper preparation of the municipality's employees
s5
or agents.'
d. Guam is not a "person." The Court stated that Congress was not
concerned with territories when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of
1871.188

e. A Native American tribe is not a "person" within § 1983.187 The
"every person" wording of the statute was not intended to include those
with common law immunities.'
3. "Who Under Color Of'
"Under color of law" is only a shibboleth' 89 for the longer recitation
of "under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom"
contained in the present criminal statute against discrimination, 18
U.S.C. § 242, and the "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage" contained in the present statute affording civil
penalties for discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.190 Section 1983 of the
United States Code title 42 and § 242 of title 18, United States Code,
trace their origin to the Civil Rights Act of 1866,'9' in which "under
color of" was used, but that statute was not the first to use the phrase.

184. Id. at 692. Municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal
policymakers under appropriate circumstances. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469, 480 (1986). The identification of policy-making decisions is a matter of state law. City
of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988). The Court in Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985) explained that "[o]bviously, if one retreats far enough from a
constitutional violation some municipal 'policy' can be identified behind almost any ...
harm inflicted by a municipal official."
185. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387-94 (1989).
186. Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 187 (1990).
187. Inyo County Calif. v. Paiute Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701 (2003).
188. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,
373-74 (1951).
189. Chief Justice Warren Burger once referred to its use as "figurative." See Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 943 (1982) (Burger, J., dissenting).
190. When 14 Stat. 27, the precusor of both statutes, was renumbered as a Revised
Statute (Rev. Stat. 5510 for the criminal statute and Rev. Stat. 1979 for the civil statute),
"any law" was unexplainedly omitted from its original version.
191. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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"Under color of" had been used previously in a variety of legal ways' 9 '
English statute enacted in 1444 used
and as a figure of speech. 9 An
194
"under color of their office."

The seventeenth-century jurist, Sir

"If a lieutenant, or other that hath
Edward Coke, in 1628 wrote:'
commission of martial authority in time of peace, hang or otherwise
96
In 1670
execute any man by color of martial law, this is murder."

the English case of Posterne v. Hanson & Hooker 97 spoke of officers
and ministers' "colour of their office."' 9 8 In 1788 "under color of law"
was used in Zane's Exors v. Cowperthwaite.99 The Judiciary Act of
1789 used "under or by color of the authority of the United States."2 °°
In 1803 Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison,'° ' wrote:
If one of the heads of departments commits any illegal act, under color
of his office, by which an individual sustains an injury, it cannot be
pretended that his office alone exempts him from being sued in the
of proceeding, and being compelled to obey the judgment
ordinary mode
2 2
of the law.

Congress used the term in 1833 when it enacted the third section of 4
Statutes at Large 632,203 in 1863 when it enacted the fourth section of

192. As an example of "colour. of title," see Cherry v. Legh, 1 Bligh NS PC 306, 311, 4
ER 886 (1827).
193. As an example, "a very unfavourable color is thrown upon it," see Dohnan v.
Nokes, 22 Beavan 402, 52 ER 1163 (1855).
194. See Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of Under Color of Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323,
342-43 n.82 (1992) (referring to 3 Statutes at Large 266, 271-72).
195. SIR EDWARD COKE, 3 INSTITUTES 52 (1628).
196. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 64 (1848).
197. 2 WMS Saunders 51, 54, 85 ER 652 (1670).
198. Id. at 655.
199. 1 U.S. 312, 313 (Pa. S. Ct. 1788). See Ligeart v. Wiseham, 3 Dyer 323b, 73 ER 732
(1794) ("the said plaintiff by color of his aforesaid once").
200. Sec. 14, 1 Stat. 82 (providing that writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend
to prisoners in jail unless they are in custody "under or by color of the authority of the
United States"). See Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. 318, 319 n.1 (1867).
201. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). In United States v. More, 7 U.S. 159, 160 (1805), an indictment
against a Justice of the Peace was returned for taking fees "under color of... office."
202. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170. This was neither the first nor the last time that the term
appears in Supreme Court decisions. See Downs v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 248 (1901)
(referring to the "force bill," which was intended to include all actions against customs
officers acting under color of their office); Lionberger v. Rouse, 76 U.S. 468, 471 (1869)
(used in the Synopsis); Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S. 437, 452 (1850) (used in the Synopsis);
Miller v. Stewart, 22 U.S. 680, 697 (1824) (the attorney's argument being quoted).
203. Sec. 3, 4 Stat. 632, 633 (1833) provides that "in any case where suit or prosecution
shall be commenced in a court of any state, against any officer ... or other person, for or
on account of any act done under the revenue laws of the United States, or under colour
thereof. .. ." This same language was substantially copied into section 16 of the Act of

2005]

UNDER COLOR OF

589

12 Statutes at Large 755,204 and when it enacted the seventh section
of 12 Statute at Large 357.2°5 The phrase was used in the twelfth
clause of Revised Statutes 563206 and the sixteenth clause of Revised
Statutes 629,207 which dealt with the jurisdiction of courts to hear
2 °s
requests for the redress of the deprivation of rights.
The Supreme Court has stated many times that the phrase "under
color of" in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. § 242209 is treated identically by the courts. 2 " Also identical are the meanings of the Civil

February 28, 1871. 16 Stat. 438, 438-39. See Gaughan v. Northwestern Fertilizing Co.,
10 F. Cas. 91 (Cir. Ct. N.D. Ill. 1873).
204. The statute provided a defense to a civil or criminal action against one who was
simply carrying out an order of the President or "under color of" any law of Congress. Sec.
4, 12 Stat. 755, 756 (1863). Section 5 of the Act provided for removal of such an action for
an offense carried out "under color of" any authority. Id. See Bigelow v. Forrest, 76 U.S.
339, 344 (1869).
205. The statute forbade the maintenance or prosecution of any suit, civil or criminal,
for any arrest or imprisonment made during the "rebellion" by virtue of or "under color
of" any authority derived from or exercised by or under the President of the United States.
12 Stat. 756 (1863). See Cutler v. Kouns, 110 U.S. 720, 724 (1884).
206. 12 § 563 Rev. Stat. 563 (1861).
207. 6 § 1979, 1 Rev. Stat. 347 (1874).
208. See Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S. 68, 71 (1900).
209. 42, § 19731 provides as follows:
No person acting under color of law shall fail or refuse to permit any person to
vote who is entitled to vote under any provision of subchapters I-A to I-C of this
chapter or is otherwise qualified to vote, or willfully fail or refuse to tabulate,
count, and report such person's vote.
In 1994 Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which contained the "under color of"
wording, but on May 15, 2000, the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional because it
exceeded Congressional power under the Commerce Clause; the statute was not saved by
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626
(2000). Singularly enough, what prompted the enactment of that statute was the same
impetus that prompted the enactment of the reconstruction statutes.
[T]he Congresses that enacted the Civil Rights Acts of 1871 and 1875 had a
purpose similar to that of Congress in enacting § 13981. There were state laws
on the books bespeaking equality of treatment, but in the administration of these
laws there was discrimination against newly freed slaves. The statements of
Representative Garfield in the House and that of Senator Sumner in the Senate
are representative: "[Tihe chief complaint is not that the laws of the States are
unequal, but that even where the laws are just and equal on their face, yet by a
systematic maladministration of them, or a neglect or refusal to enforce their
provisions, a portion of the people are denied equal protection under them."
Id. at 624-25.
210. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29 n.5 (1980); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 153 n.7 (1970); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966); Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 185 (1961).
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Rights Acts' "under color of" and the Fourteenth Amendment's "state action,"211 the resolution of which is a question of law.212

4. "Any Statute, Ordinance, Regulation, Custom, or Usage"
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, the Ku Klux Klan Act,213 added
"usage" to "law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,"2 14 but the
Revised Statutes of 1874 and 1875 omitted "law" from the recitation of
authority.215 The Supreme Court made it clear in Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co.2"' that for a "custom or usage" to be actionable under
§ 1983 there must be state involvement and "not simply a practice that
reflects longstanding social habits, generally observed by the people in
a locality."217 Two strong dissents in the case21 ' took the position
that a custom or usage can simply be "a widespread and longstanding
practice, commonly regarded as prescribing norms for conduct, and
cso
... of any State'
backed by sanctions, 77219 and "'[t]he custom
includes the unwritten commitment, stronger than ordinances, statutes,
and regulations, by which men live and arrange their lives."22 °
" ' the Court further
In Monell v. Department of Social Services,22
opined that "it is when execution of a government's policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the
government as an entity is responsible under § 1983. "222
'

211. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 28 (1991) ("just as broad"); Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184;
Price, 383 U.S. at 794 n.7. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 929 (discussing the Supreme Court's
exposition of the difference between "under color of" and "state action"). See infra note 670.
212. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 996-98 (1982); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,
342 n.6 (1980).
213. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). See supra note 66.
214. Id.
215. See Revisor's Draft (1872) (containing no explanation); Monroe, 365 U.S. at 213
n.18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
216. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
217. Id. at 166-67. The Court added, "[T]he statute ... expressly requires that the
'custom, or usage' be that 'of any State,' not simply of the people living in a state." Id. at
167.
218. See id. at 179-234 (Brennan and Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
219. Id. at 224 (Brennan and Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
220. Id. at 181 (Brennan and Douglas, JJ., dissenting). Nine years prior the Court had
an opportunity to explore the meaning of "custom" but sidestepped it, determining no
evidence existed to convict on grounds of breach of the peace. See Garner v. Louisiana, 368
U.S. 157, 163-64 (1961).
221. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
222. Id. at 694.
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5. "Ofany State or Territory or the Districtof Columbia"
The District of Columbia was added when the statute was renumbered from 8 U.S.C. § 43 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in 1952.223
6. "Subjects or Causes to be Subjected"
The Court has not expounded upon the phrase "subjects or causes
to be subjected," but from its cases, a rule and five exceptions can be
discerned. 2 4 It appears the mere presence of the state is usually
sufficient to establish "state action," which has subjected a person to a
deprivation of his or her rights. The state may prove, however, that its
presence had nothing to do with the deprivation because the state did
not coerce anyone to deprive another of his or her rights. 22' There may
be situations when the effect of the state's presence is primed by another
22
Voluntarily acting in concert with the state seems to
presence.26
excuse proof of coercion. 2 7 Instances exist in which there is really no
coercion on the part of the state, but "under color of" or "state action" is
found because the state permitted the "state actor"228 to receive a
benefit that should not have been received,2 29 or because the state is
permitting the "state actor" to perform one or more of its traditional
"public functions."2 3 °

223. See supra text accompanying notes 156-57.
224. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
225. See Am. Mfgrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999) (stating that "[tihe
State's decision to allow insurer to withhold payments ... can ... be seen as state
inaction . . ." Id. at 53; NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988); Blum, 457 U.S. 991
(1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149
(1978) (stating that "the crux of the respondent's complaint is not that the State has acted,
but that it has refused to act." Id. at 166); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak,
343 U.S. 451 (1952).
226. In Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), a public defender was paid by the
state, but the employer-employee relationship was primed by the attorney-client
relationship. This exception to the rule is to be distinguished from the exception found in
Parrattv. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), when state action was established, but recovery
denied because negligence of the "state actor" did not equate with lack of due process.
227. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
228. The Supreme Court has defined a "state actor" as a "state official," or one who
"has acted together with a state official," or one whose "conduct is otherwise chargeable to
the State." See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
229. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
230. Georgia v. McCollom, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614 (1991).
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7. "Any Citizen of the United States or Other Person Within the
JurisdictionThereof'
The Civil Rights Act of 1866231 declared that the protected persons
were "inhabitants of any State or Territory." The Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871232 changed that designation to "any person within the jurisdiction
of the United States."233 The present wording was incorporated by 8
U.S.C. § 43: "any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof" who is deprived of rights secured by the Constitution and laws is furnished a cause of action for that deprivation.3 4
Apparently, no interpretation of that wording in § 1983 exists, but the
Supreme Court in New York Thansit Authority v. Beazer 235 wrote about
similar wording in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,2 36 stating that the amendment announces a fundamental
principle: "the State must govern impartially. General rules that apply
evenhandedly.., comply with this principle. Only when a governmental unit adopts a rule that has a special impact on less than all the
persons subject to its jurisdiction
does the question whether this
237
principle is violated arise."

8. "To the Deprivation of'
The Fourth Amendment 238 (applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment) protects against a person being intentionally
a been opined
deprived of that person's property by seizure. 2391 It has
that prohibited Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual punishment" is
evidenced by a "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs,"
240
whereas simple negligence gives rise to merely a malpractice action
and not a deprivation of constitutional rights.241

231. 14 Stat. 27 (See supra text accompanying notes 36-43).
232. Id. (See supra text accompanying notes 65-73).
233. Sec. 1, 17 Stat. 13.
234. 8 U.S.C. § 43 (1926).
235. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
236. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing: "nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any persons within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
237. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587-88 (1979).
238. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
239. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 72 (1992), in which the Court held that
one deprives an owner of his mobile home under color of state law by "physically tearing
it from its foundation and towing it to another lot."
240. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1976).
241. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986).
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9. "Any Rights, Privileges or Immunities Secured by the Constitution
and Laws"
a. "Any Rights." The wording of the statute has been modified from
"any right secured or protected by this act"24 to "any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States"243 to
"any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States."'2 " In 1884 United States Supreme Court
Justice Stanley Matthews opined that "[i]t might be difficult to
enumerate the several descriptions of rights secured to individuals by
the constitution, the deprivation of which, by any person, would subject
the latter to an action for redress under section 1979, Rev. St."245 The
Supreme Court has said that "[§1 1983 merely provides a mechanism for
enforcing individual rights 'secured' elsewhere, i.e., rights independently
'secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States."2 4
Standing alone, § 1983 clearly provides no protection for civil rights
since ...

§ 1983 does not provide any substantive rights at all. To be

sure, it may be argued that § 1983 does in some sense "provid[e] for the
protection of civil rights" when it authorizes a cause of action based on
of civil rights guaranteed by other Acts of Conthe deprivation
24 7
gress.

The Court has made several other similar pronouncements, for
example, "[i]n order to seek redress through § 1983 ... a plaintiff must
assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal
law. '24s Also, "the express cause of action for damages created by

242. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27.
243. The Ku Klux Klan Act, 17 Stat. 13.
244. Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1874). See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S.
600, 608 (1979).
245. Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 323 (1884).
246. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2003) (holding that the Federal Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000), which prohibits the federal
funding of educational institutions that have a policy or practice of releasing educational
records to unauthorized persons, does not create a right of the aggrieved person to sue
under § 1983). "[One cannot go into court and claim a 'violation of § 1983'-for § 1983 by
itself does not protect anyone against anything." Chapman, 441 U.S. at 617. In that
regard the discharged teachers in Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 837, were incorrect; the Court
said that "they allege that respondents [employers] violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Perhaps
a more accurate statement of the procedural aspects is found in NCAA, 488 U.S. at 181,
where the Court said the appellee alleged that "he had been deprived of his Fourteenth
Amendment... rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id.
247. Chapman, 441 U.S. at 618.
248. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). In 1909 Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, writing for the Court in Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909), said that a
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§ 1983 constitutes the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights
guaranteed in § 1981249 by state governmental units .... ,"250 Thus,
the actionable rights must not be vague and amorphous."'
b. "Any... privileges or immunities." Section 2 of Article IV of
the Constitution provides that "[tlhe citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States."2 52 It has been opined that this constitutional provision does
not import that a citizen of one state carries with him into another state
fundamental privileges and immunities that come to him necessarily by
the mere fact of his citizenship in his state. If a citizen of state A enters
state B, then state B may not deprive the citizen of state A of those
privileges and immunities enjoyed by the citizens of state B.253
10. "Secured by the Constitution and Laws"
a. The Due Process Clause. It has been opined that the most
familiar office of the Due Process Clause is to provide a guarantee of fair
procedure in connection with the deprivation of life, liberty, or property

person held in custody upon orders of the Governor of a state during an insurrection, was
not deprived of a constitutional right because
[s]o long as such arrests are made in good faith and in the honest belief that they
are needed in order to head the insurrection off, the governor is the final judge
and cannot be subjected to an action after he is out of office, on the ground that
he had not reasonable ground for his belief.
Id. See also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979), in which a man was arrested
under a valid warrant (and hence "under color of" law), but later released due to mistaken
identity. The Court held that he had no cause of action under § 1983 because he was not
deprived of his constitutional rights without due process of law. Id. at 140. He was
subjected to a false arrest not due to lack of due process, but a mistaken identity. At the
time of his arrest, he was in possession of the driver's license issued to his brother who was
a fugitive from justice. Id.
249. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000) (providing, inter alia, that
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
to every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
The rights so protected, are, inter alia,protected against impairment "under color of law.").
250. Jett, 491 U.S. at 733.
251. See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994); Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340.
252. -U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
253. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939).
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by a state.254 The Court has often proclaimed the substantive rights
the Clause does not protect, such as private rights of contract obtained
under a state statute.15 Nor does the Clause, under certain conditions, prevent a person from being held in custody upon orders of the
governor of a state in insurrection. 256 A man arrested, but later
released due to a mistaken identity, was not deprived of his due process
rights because that type of tort does not give rise to an action under
§ 1983, and the state had provided the prisoner with means of redressing his deprivation.257
"Liberty," deprivation of which the Due Process Clause prevents, has
given rise to "liberty interests," defined by the Supreme Court as
confinement, without more, of"a nondangerous individual who is capable
of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and
responsible family members or friends."2 51 "Liberty interests," howev-

er, include more than the right not to be unnecessarily confined.259
The Fourteenth Amendment's right to practice one's calling is a "liberty
interest" but is subject to some governmental regulation.2 " The
Supreme Court has proclaimed that damages to one's reputation is not

254. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). A United States
district judge recently opined that "unnecessary stress, confusion, and wasted time," even
if caused by one acting under color of law, is not compensable under § 1983 because
freedom from such harassment is not guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. See Wright
v. Onembo, No. Civ. A. 99-4778, 2000 WL 1521567 at **4, 5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2000).
255. Collins, 503 U.S. at 125.
256. See Moyer, 212 U.S. at 85. ('So long as arrests are made in good faith and in the
honest belief that they are needed in order to head the insurrection off, the governor is the
final judge and cannot be subjected to an action after he is out of office, on the ground that
he had not reasonable ground for his belief."). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes made it clear
that the duration of the detention might make a difference on whether constitutional rights
were involved. Id.
257. Parratt,451 U.S. 527. That case was overruled to the extent that it said that one
may be "deprived" of property by the negligence of the state. Id. at 531. See Daniels, 474
U.S. at 330. See supra text accompanying note 248 and infra text accompanying note 268.
258. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). The Court added that, "[tihere
can be no doubt that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital, like involuntary
confinement of an individual for any reason, is a deprivation of liberty which the State
cannot accomplish without due process of law." Id. at 580. A patient who was admitted
to a state mental health treatment facility as a result of his "voluntary" admission forms
signed while he was heavily sedated is deprived of his liberty interest despite postdeprivation damage remedies available to him. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 138
(1990).
259. See Pub. Utils., 343 U.S. at 468 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
260. Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286,293 (1999) (holding the Constitution is not violated
by the execution of a search warrant, "whether calculated to annoy or even to prevent [an
attorney's] consultation with a grand jury witness"). Id. at 293.
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a "liberty interest." 28 1 An unlawful denial of a state right to hold a
state political office is not a right to property or liberty secured by the
Due Process Clause.28 2
b. The Commerce Clause.
in a § 1983 action.2 63

A Commerce Clause right is enforceable

c. The Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court has held
that state courts that upheld restrictive covenants as to the use of land
constituted "state action" in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.2 4
d. The Eighth Amendment. Depriving a prisoner of proper
medical treatment may constitute "cruel and unusual punishment"
under the Eighth Amendment when such deprivation evinces a
"deliberate indifference to serious medical needs;" mere negligence (e.g.,
failure to order an x-ray), rather than being the subject of an Eighth
Amendment-based § 1983 action, is the proper subject of a malpractice
action in state court. 265 The Court has said that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain' . .. proscribed by the Eighth Amend266
ment."
B.

The CriminalStatute-18 U.S.C. § 242

Section 242, which provides criminal penalties for the perpetration of
discrimination, contains the following language:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, willfully 26 7 subjects any person in any State, Territory,
Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights,

261. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 699, 708-09 (1976) (where recovery was denied
when a city police chief circulated a flyer with a person's name and photograph appearing
under a caption proclaiming "Active Shoplifters"). Also, one who lost his job because of a
letter written by a former supervisor to a prospective employer had not lost a "liberty"
interest that could be the subject of a § 1983 action. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233
(1991).
262. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7 (1944).
263. Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 451 (1991).
264. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10 (1948).
265. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1976).
266. Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
267. The state-of-the-mind requirement mandated by use of the word "willfully" does
not appear in the civil counterpart of § 242. Daniels v. Williams, 44 U.S. 327, 329-30
(1986).
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privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or

laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or
penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his
color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall
be fined under this title or imprisonment not more than one year, or
both ......

There are slight, superficial differences between the two statutes. The
authority provision of § 1983 contains the wording "any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,"269 whereas the authority
provision of § 242 contains the wording "any statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom." 27 0 The protected rights provisions of § 1983
contain the words "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws,"27' whereas the protected rights provision of
or immunities secured or
§ 242 contains the words "rights, privileges,
272
laws."
or
Constitution
the
by
protected
Section 1983 of title 42 and § 242 of title 18 are mechanisms of
enforcement. They do not forbid deprivation of constitutional or other
rights. They simply offer one who has been deprived of such rights a
mechanism by which that deprivation may be addressed-§ 1983 by civil
action and § 242 by criminal prosecution.2 73 It has been opined that
a section 1983 claim may be brought directly to federal court even
though an adequate state remedy exists and ... state remedies need
not first be exhausted .... [S]ection 1983 does not, in and of itself,

provide any substantive basis for a claim or for relief. Rather, it is a
procedural device by which a plaintiff may bring a claim for relief
or infringement on, a federal constitutional
based on the deprivation27of,
4
right or statutory right.

268. 18 U.S.C. § 242. Originally, Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 2, 14 Stat. 27; incorporated
by Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 141, 144; the statute became § 5510, Rev.
Stat. of 1874-1878. § 5510 Rev. Stat. (1909 Criminal Code reenacted as § 20, 35 Stat.
1092. § 52, 44 Stat. 462 became part of the U.S. Code in 1926, and in 1948 it was
renumbered as 18 U.S.C. § 242. See the Appendix to the plurality opinion of Justice
Frankfurter in United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 83 (1945).
269. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
270. 18 U.S.C. § 242.
271. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
272. 18 U.S.C. § 242.
273. "[O]ne cannot go into court and claim a 'violation of § 1983'-for § 1983 by itself
does not protect anyone against anything." Chapman, 441 U.S. at 617.
274. Parker v. Grand Hyatt Hotel, 124 F. Supp. 2d 79, 86 (D.D.C. 2000). The Court in
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976) said that § 1983 "creates a species of tort
liability that on its face admits of no immunities."
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There are other mechanisms that offer redress for deprivation, for
example, ordinary complaints, answers, motions in limine, even
appellate briefs. When a deprived person uses § 1983, it must be alleged
and proved that the wrongdoer acted "under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage."275 When the sovereign uses
§ 242, it must be alleged and proved that the wrongdoer willfully acted
2 76
"under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom.,,

If § 1983 or § 242 are not used, it must be alleged and proved that the
wrongdoer's acts of deprivation constituted "state action."
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS OF "UNDER COLOR OF" OR
"STATE ACTION"

It was not until 1915 that the United States Supreme Court in Myers
v. Anderson277 considered the term "under color of" in connection with
a deprivation of rights case. Prior to that time, the Court referred to the
term only in passing and not in connection with deprivation of rights.
In five cases, the Court indicated that if an act was performed "under
color of" some authority it was performed under the auspices of a
79
These are
sovereign. 278 A 1932 case came to the same conclusion.
280
the
however,
cases,
eight
In
suits.
the so-called "official capacity"

court indicated that if an act was performed "under color of" some
authority it was performed without the auspices of a sovereign.28 1

275. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
276. 18 U.S.C. § 242.
277. 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
278. See Lockhart v. Johnson, 181 U.S. 516, 529 (1901) (observing that one's title by
"a prior possession under color of law or title being sufficient as against an ouster by a
mere trespasser"); McCain v. City of Des Moines, 174 U.S. 168, 179 (1899) (discussing the
effect of "overturning an authority that had lasted four years, and which had been initiated
under color and by reason of an act of the legislature"); Lanahan v. Sears, 102 U.S. 318,
321-22 (1880) (a constitutional homestead protects "the domestic sanctuary from every
species of intrusion which, under color of law, would subject the property, by any
disposition whatever, to the payment of debts"); Tweed's Case, 83 U.S. 504, 518 (1872) (the
defense was to the effect that property sought to be sequestered was being held by
defendant "under color of the acts of Congress"); Baltimore v. Baltimore R.R., 77 U.S. 543,
553 (1870) (the subject "tax was enacted under color of law").
279. Sterling v. Constantine, 287 U.S. 378, 393 (1932) (enjoining a state governor and
other state officials from enforcing their military or executive orders regulating or
restricting production of oil).
280. See infra text accompanying note 288.
281. See Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382, 387 (1897) (dealing with a statute
which prohibited "any extortion or willful oppression under color of law" in connection with
the collection of taxes); D. M. Osborne v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 147 U.S. 248, 258 (1893)
(referring to the "appropriation of private property to public use, under color of law, but in
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These are the so-called "personal capacity" suits. 28 2 Between 1915 and
March 2004, the United States Supreme Court considered forty cases in
which either "under color of" or "state action" were discussed. Thirtythree of those cases mentioned (and many of them discussed) "state
of;" seven of them restricted their
action" as well as "under color
283
of.
color
"under
to
discussion
Two major types of cases have emerged.2 84 One in which the
wrongdoer is the state and the other in which the wrongdoer is a private
party, often referred to by the Court as the "state actor."28 5 The Court
has referred to the first type of case as the "official capacity" case.2 8
This Article refers to them as such and also as the "use of authority"
cases. The Court has referred to the second type of case as the "personal

fact without authority"); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 281 (1885) (referring to
"the wrongdoer, who under color of law, but without law, disturbs or dispossesses him");
Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Comm'r of Immigration, 113 U.S. 33, 38
(1885) (referring to money paid by plaintiff "and received by defendant under color of law,
and paid by plaintiff in ignorance of its rights"); Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U.S. 633, 640 (1884)
(referring to "acts, performed or omitted under orders of officers of the government, even
when there was only color of authority"); Read v. Plattsmouth, 107 U.S. 568, 580 (1883)
(referring to bonds that were issued "under color of law, whether general or special, but
without actual authority"); Voorhees v. Jackson, 35 U.S. 449, 474 (1836) (the Court opining
that:
[i]f not warranted by the constitution or law of the land, our most solemn
proceedings can confer no right which is denied to any judicial act under colour of
law, which can properly be deemed to have been done coram non judice; that is,
by persons assuming the judicial function in the given case without lawful
authority);
Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 559 (1819) ("The illegal proceedings
in the reign of Charles II were under color of law").
282. See infra text accompanying note 288.
283. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971);
Pub. Utils., 343 U.S. at 451; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Myers v. Anderson, 238
U.S. 368 (1915).
284. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 639 F.2d
1058, 1063 (4th Cir. 1981), saw three types. In the first type of case the deprivation was
the result of some official act of the state. In the second, "private actors alone are alleged
to have engaged in what could be called the operational or enforcement level, in conduct
that deprived of a secured right" i.e., no state official is involved. Id. The third type
involves "the conduct of a private defendant.., alleged to have combined with the acts of
state officials at the enforcement or operational level to cause deprivation of a secured
right," i.e., the involvement of a state official provides the state action. Id.
285. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937 (defining "state actor" as "a state official" or one who "has
acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials" or "his conduct is
otherwise chargeable to the State").
286. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991).
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capacity" cases. 28' This Article refers to them as such and also as the
"abuse of authority" cases.
The second type of case has five sub-types. In sub-type II-A the state
actor is an employee or agent of the state with complete authority to
take certain action, but the state actor intentionally or negligently
misuses that authority. In sub-type I-B the state actor is merely
following some dictate of the state. In sub-type II-C the state actor,
whether or not an employee or agent of the state, conspires with an
employee of the state who is either guilty of the deprivation or has a
"symbiotic" relationship with the state. In sub-type II-D the state actor
is usually not an employee or agent of the state but is guilty of the
deprivation while receiving some benefit from the state. 288 In sub-type
II-E the state actor is usually not an employee or agent of the state but
is guilty of the deprivation, having been delegated some authority by the
29
an "exclusive prerogative of the sovereign" 1
state that is historically
290
or a "public function."
There follows synopses of the forty, aforementioned, Supreme Court
decisions.
A.

Type I-The "Official Capacity" or "Use of Authority" Cases

From 1915 to 1991, the Supreme Court dealt with "under color of" or
"state action" in nine "official capacity or use of authority" (Type I) cases.
In Myers v. Anderson,2 9 Nixon v. Condon,2 92 and Lane v. Wilson,293
the Court permitted money damages to be recovered against state

287. Id. at 25.
288. This type of case, involving a state actor who discriminates while operating "under
color of," is to be distinguished from the case in which the state itself violates the
Constitution by giving benefit to a private party who is assisted in its discrimination by
the benefit it receives from the State. See Norwood, 413 U.S. at 467 (proclaiming in dictum
that traditional state monopolies such as electricity, water, police, and fire protection do
not in and of themselves establish state involvement in invidious discrimination). Id. at
465. Cf Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966) (extending that pronouncement to
municipal recreational facilities).
289. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 160 (1978).
290. The "public function" principle had its origin in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,
507 (1946), where a Jehovah's Witness was convicted of criminal trespass for distributing
literature without a license on a sidewalk in Chickasaw, Alabama, a so-called "company
town," i.e., a municipality wholly owned by a private corporation. The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction because the performance of a "public function" by a private entity
deprived the Witness of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 510.
291. 238 U.S. 368, 382-83 (1915).
292. 286 U.S. 73, 105-06 (1932).
293. 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
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officials who simply followed their state law governing elections.29 4 In
29 5
all six Justices considering the matter296
Shelley v. Kraemer,
agreed that in a case to enforce restrictive covenants, which deprived
citizens of their Fourteenth Amendment rights, the state's supreme court
In
rulings approving the covenants constituted "state action."29 7
2 95
when
a
state
O'Connor v. Donaldson, all nine Justices agreed that
committed a "nondangerous" person to a state mental hospital, damages
could be recovered against the state because of "state action."299 Eight
Justices300 agreed that "under color of law" had been established in
Parrattv. Taylor,3 ° ' when a state prisoner's personal property was lost
due to the negligence of prison guards, but the state prisoner could not
recover the value of his lost property because negligence does not
establish lack of due process. 30 2 In Hafer v. Melo,30 all eight Justices 30 4 agreed that the discharge of state employees entailed "state
action."30 5
Only in Reitman v. Mulkey, °6 when the Court decided that an
amendment to a state constitution gave state citizens complete discretion
on the use and alienation of their property, was there a five to four
split. 30 7 The four dissenters agreed with the five-member majority
38
that the process of amending the constitution was "state action;"
their disagreement with the majority was over the fact that they
considered the impact of the amendment to be a manifestation of
''governmental neutrality" rather than constitutionally prohibited "state
cooperation or partnership."3 9 In Kentucky v. Graham,31 ° all nine

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id. at 275-77.
334 U.S. 1, 10 (1948).
Justices Reed, Jackson, and Rutledge did not participate.
334 U.S. at 20.
422 U.S. 563 (1975).
Id. at 577. The court also ruled that damages could be imposed against state

officials in the case. Id.

300. Justice Marshall dissented in part. See infra note 350.
301. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
302.

Id. at 543-44.

303.
304.

502 U.S. 21 (1991).
Justice Thomas did not participate.

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

502 U.S. at 27.
387 U.S. 369 (1967).
Id. at 387.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 394.
473 U.S. 159 (1985).
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Justices agreed that in "personal capacity" cases, costs are not taxed to
the employer of the "state actor.""'
The first deprivation case decided by the Supreme Court under the
precursor to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Revised Statute § 1979, 312 was Myers
v.Anderson."' Three persons of African descent brought an action for
damages against two election officials who refused to register them due
to their race.314 The Court, matter-of-factly, affirmed an award of an
unspecified amount of damages without discussion of the term "under
color of" contained in the revised statute.1 5
In Nixon v. Condon,3 16 a person of African descent brought an action
against judges of Texas elections to recover damages for their refusal to
permit him to vote in a Democratic primary due to his race. 7 The
district court dismissed the suit because a state statute had permitted
political parties to determine the qualification of its members.1 ' The
1 9 Justice
Fifth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court reversed."
Benjamin Cardozo, writing for the five-member majority, left no doubt
that this was an "official capacity" action:
Indeed, adherence to the statute leads to the conclusion that a
resolution once adopted by the committee must continue to be binding
upon the judges of election though the party in convention may have
sought to override it, unless the committee, yielding to the moral force
of numbers, shall revoke its earlier action and obey the party will.
Power so intrenched is statutory, not inherent. If the state had not
conferred it, there would be hardly color of right to give a basis for its
exercise. 320

311.

Id. at 165.

312. See supra text accompanying note 70.
313. 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
314. Id. at 377.
315. Id. at 383. There were no dissenting votes. Justice McReynolds did not
participate in the consideration or decision of the case. Id.
316. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
317.

Id.

318. Id. at 81.
319. Id. at 89.
320. Id. at 85. Five years prior to this case, the Supreme Court held invalid the Texas
statute which provided that "in no event shall a negro be eligible to participate in a
Democratic party primary election."' Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927). Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote the majority opinion in which he said that "[s]tates may do
a good deal of classifying that it is difficult to believe rational, but there are limits, and it
is too clear for extended argument that color cannot be made the basis of a statutory
classification affecting the right set up in this case." Id.at 541.
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In Lane v. Wilson,"' persons of African descent sued three county
election officials for $5000 damages under 8 U.S.C. § 43322 because the
county election officials, following a state statute, denied them registration in the Oklahoma general election due to their race, in violation of
the Fifteenth Amendment. 323 The Supreme Court, concluding that the
state statute decreed the discrimination and that the officials acted
"under color of" the statute, held that plaintiffs were entitled to
relief.324 Justice Frankfurter, writing the majority opinion, stated:
"The basis of this action is inequality of treatment though under color
of law, not denial of the right to vote." 25 The Court, however, did not
specify whether the money judgment, which was to be entered on
remand, would be against the election officials personally, as named
defendants, or against the State of Oklahoma. 326 Two Justices dissented (though without writing an opinion) because they thought the lower
court was correct.32 7
In Shelley v. Kraemer,2 1 there were restrictive covenants in recorded
instruments based on a common law policy of denying people of African
and Mongolian descent the right to own property in a certain subdivision
containing property owned by people of the Caucasian race. Certain
Caucasians sued a person of African descent for injunctive relief to
enforce the covenants. The Fourteenth Amendment was asserted as a
defense. 9 The highest courts of Michigan and Missouri upheld the
covenants.3 3 ' The United States Supreme Court reversed, 3 1 determining that the action of the state's supreme court was "state action,"
which violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."3 2 Chief Justice Vinson wrote: "The judicial act of the highest

321. 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
322. Id. at 268. The precursor to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (see supra text accompanying notes
70-72).
323. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
324. Lane, 307 U.S. at 274.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 277. From recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court (see infra text
accompanying notes 344-61), the judgment should be against the state and not against the
state agents personally.
327. Lane, 307 U.S. at 277. Justices McReynolds and Butler dissented without opinion.
Justice Douglas did not participate.
328. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
329. Id. at 12.
330. Id. at 4.
331. Thurgood Marshall represented one of the Petitioners.
332. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19. Determining that both the buyer and seller were willing
and able sellers and purchasers, Chief Justice Vinson wrote: "[I]t is clear that but for the
active intervention of the state courts, supported by the full panoply of state power,
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court of the state, in authoritatively construing and enforcing its laws,
is the act of the state."33 The vote to reverse was six to zero. 3 4
In Reitman v. Mulkey, 33' a provision of the California Constitution
provided that neither the state nor any subdivision or agency shall deny
the right of an owner of property to decline to sell or lease on the basis
Alleged victims of "absolute
of the owner's absolute discretion.3
discretion" sought an injunction and damages against the private parties
who discriminated against them because of their race in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 3 7 The Court affirmed the California Supreme Court, which held that the state constitutional provision in
question was "state action" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.338
Justice Byron White wrote:
Here we are dealing with a provision which does not just repeal an
existing law forbidding private racial discriminations. [The Constitutional provision in question] was intended to authorize, and does
authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market. The right to
discriminate is now one of the basic policies of the State. 9

petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties in question without restraint."

Id.
333. Id. at 15 (quoting Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1908)).
334. Justices Reed, Jackson, and Rutledge did not participate. Id. at 23.
335. 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (Thurgood Marshall was involved as Solicitor General of the
United States).
336. Id. at 370.
337. Id. at 371.
338. Id. at 392. The California constitutional provision in question, Art I, Sec. 26, was
the result of the famous California "Proposition 14," an attempt in 1964 to counteract a
series of enactments by the California legislature to restrict the rights of private
landowners to discriminate on the basis of race. The California electorate approved
Proposition 14 by a two-to-one margin in the popular referendum resulting in the
amendment in question.
Justice Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Black, Clark, and Stewart
joined. They thought that a state's decision to remain "neutral" cannot be "state action."
Id. at 387-95 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan stated that the only evidence that the
California Supreme Court had before it indicating that the amendment was discriminatory
was that many of the proponents of Proposition 14 had voiced strong opposition to the
aforementioned series of anti-discrimination enacted by the California legislature. Id. at
390-91 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan opined that
[a] state enactment, particularly one that is simply permissive of private decisionmaking rather than coercive and one that has been adopted in this most
democratic of processes, should not be struck down by the judiciary under the
Equal Protection Clause without persuasive evidence of an invidious purpose or
effect.
Id. at 391 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
339. Id. at 380-81.
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Four Justices dissented.34 °
34 1
one who had been committed to a state
In O'Connor v.Donaldson,
1983
action seeking damages against the
a
§
brought
mental hospital
staff members, alleging that he
several
and
hospital's superintendent
Amendment right to
his
Fourteenth
had been maliciously deprived of
342
The Supreme Court unanimously held that he could
liberty.
maintain the action based upon the reason explained by Justice Stewart
in the Court's opinion: "[A] state cannot constitutionally confine without
more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in
with the help of willing and responsible family
freedom by himself or
3 43
members or friends.
Another issue considered by the Court was whether a money judgment
could be entered against the Superintendent because he claimed he was
merely following the dictates of his office.344 The Court made it clear
that upon remand the circuit court of appeals was to consider only the
issue of whether the superintendent was to be held personally liable for
damages; if it answered that question in the affirmative, it was to
of whether the
remand the case to the district court for a determination
3 45
superintendent had an immunity from damages.
Parratt v. Taylor 34' dealt with a § 1983 action filed by a prisoner
against prison officials (guards), seeking to recover the value of his
hobby kit, which was lost through the negligence of the officials in
deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. 3 47 The Court lost no
time in concluding that this deprivation occurred "under color of state
law" because defendants were "state employees in positions of considerable authority. 34" The prisoner's action was deficient, however, and
recovery was denied because his deprivation was not of a constitutional

340. Id. at 391 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justices Black, Clark, and Stewart joined
Justice Harlan in his dissent, which acknowledged that the act of the state legislature in
enacting the new statute was "state action." Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
341. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
342. Id. at 565.
343. Id. at 576.
344. It must be noted that while this was a § 1983 case, no mention was made of the
term "under color of" and while "state actors" were named rather than the state itself, this
was an "official capacity"/"use of authority" case and not a "personal capacity" case.
345. O'Connor,422 U.S. at 577.
346. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
347. Id. at 529.
348. Id. at 535-36.
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right. Therefore, the negligence did not equate
with lack of due process
3 50
of law.349 One Justice partially dissented.
In Kentucky v. Graham,35' a § 1983 action, seeking money damages
for a raid and subsequent arrest 352 made without a warrant, was
brought against the Commissioner of the Kentucky State Police,
individually and as an official of the state, under the Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments. The State was not sued
for damages, but an assessment of attorney fees was sought should
plaintiffs eventually prevail. 353 Based upon the precedent of Brandon
v. Holt,354 which made clear the distinction between "official capacity"
and "personal liability" actions, the Supreme Court held that it was error
to award fees against the governmental entity that employed the "state
actor" because this was a "personal liability" and not an "official
capacity" action.35 5 When one seeks recovery against a sovereign,
there is a greater burden than when one seeks recovery merely against
an official of the sovereign. Writing the unanimous opinion, Justice
Thurgood Marshall stated:
[T]o establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to show
that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation
of a federal right. More is required in an official-capacity action,
however, for a governmental entity is liable under § 1983 only when
the entity itself is a "moving force" behind the deprivation.356

349. Id. at 543.
350. Though Justice Thurgood Marshall agreed with practically everything in the
majority opinion, he could not agree with the judgment of the Court because there was
nothing in the record establishing that the prisoner had been informed by the officials that
he had alternative means of redress. Id. at 555 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
351. 473 U.S. 159 (1985).
352. Plaintiffs alleged that they were "severely beaten, terrorized, illegally searched,
and falsely arrested." Id. at 161.
353. Id.
354. 469 U.S. 464 (1985), which was decided just six months earlier. For an earlier
case to the same effect, see Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 50
(1944).
355. Graham,473 U.S. at 162. While this statement of the rule is correct, it may have
been made inappropriately here because this appears to be an "official capacity" case rather
than a "personal liability" one. The reason for naming the Commissioner of Police
individually as well as in his official capacity is not elucidated. Id.
356. Id. at 166 (citations omitted). It was also said that
[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a governmental
official for actions he takes under color of state law .... Official-capacity suits,

in contrast, "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against
an entity of which an officer is an agent.". . . As long as the government entity
receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all
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In Hafer v. Melo,357 the Supreme Court permitted discharged
employees of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to bring a § 1983
action for damages against the State's Auditor General in her personal
capacity. 58

Justice O'Connor, writing the Court's unanimous opin-

ion 35 9 and expanding on Graham, made it clear that in an "official
capacity" case the real party in interest is the governmental unit, even
if it is not made a party defendant.36 ° Even though a suit against a
state for official acts performed by state officials is an action against the
state itself, the Court held that damages may be recovered in a § 1983
action against those officials who deprived others of their federal rights
simply because those officials performed their duties as authorized by
the governmental entity that employed them." 1 The rationale for that
proposition was that when it was said in Will v. Department of State
Police362 that those officials were not "persons" within § 1983, what
was intended was that such officials were not covered by § 1983 in an
"official capacity" action; they "fit comfortably," however, within the
statutory term "person" when named in a "personal liability" action.363
The second reason for the Court's decision is that "[sitate executive
officials are not entitled to absolute immunity for their official acHence, it appears that when there is no deviation from the
tions."
official dictates of the authority, both the state official and the state may
be sued under § 1983.365

respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. It is not a
suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity.
Id. at 159 (citations omitted).
357. 502 U.S. 21 (1991).
358. Id. at 23.
359. Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or opinion of the case. Id. at 31.
360. Id. at 25.
361. Id. at 25, 31. "[Flulfilling governmental responsibilities" as the Court expressed
the concept. Id. at 28.
362. 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989).
363. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 27. Because Justice Thomas did not participate in the case,

that explains why he did not object to the Court's reference to "personal capacity" actions.
It is curious, however, that Justice Scalia, who along with Justice Thomas thought that
Monroe, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), was incorrectly decided, failed to object.
364. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 29. See infra note 556 regarding the Supreme Court's ruling
in Wyatt v.Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 159 (1992), regarding immunities.
365. It would appear that under the liberal Rules of Civil Procedure a "personal
liability" count may be joined with an "official capacity" count.
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Type II-The "PersonalCapacity"Cases

1. Sub-type I-A-Misuse or abuse of authority, i.e., the "pretense" or
'pretext" meaning of "under color of'
The cases that fall into sub-type II-A are those involving an "abuse"
Perhaps the
or "misuse" of authority possessed by an official.3"'
question that has perplexed more legal minds than any other in this
quest for the meaning of "under color of" is whether the term is broad
enough to include acts of officials that are performed outside the scope
of their authority. For example, are the acts of a police officer, who,
pursuant to a valid warrant of arrest, uses excessive force to effect the
arrest "under color of" the authority of his office, or is the term limited
to official acts of the sovereign that would give rise to an "official
capacity" type of action?
36 7 and Screws v. United States 368 indicate
United States v. Classic
that "under color of" contained in the statutes providing a remedy for
deprivation of rights includes the intentional excessiveness to warrant
conviction.36 9 The first split of opinion about the breadth of the term
appeared in Screws.37 ° Justice William 0. Douglas, in his plurality
opinion, made it clear that the term was broad enough to include abuse
of authority by officials. 7 ' If officials exceeded their authority, they
were not acting "under law," but "under color of law" or in "pretense" of
the law.372 Justice Wiley B. Rutledge, in a concurring opinion slightly
longer than the plurality opinion, stated that he would have voted to
affirm the conviction of the state officials who had exceeded their
authority but for his position that Congress, in enacting the precursor
to 18 U.S.C. § 242, lacked the power to pass a statute making a state
official guilty of a crime which was, in fact, an offense of the state.37 3
by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, dissented
Justice Roberts, joined
37 4
on the same ground.

366. See, e.g., Screws, 325 U.S. 91.
367. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
368. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
369. In Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382, 387 (1897), the Supreme Court dealt
with a statute that used the term "under color of law" to prohibit acts in excess of authority
for the purpose of extorting and oppressing in connection with the collection of taxes.
370. Screws, 325 U.S. at 91.
371. Id. at 111.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 133 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
374. See infra note 415.
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Williams v. United States375 continued the "pretence" meaning of
"under color of," with Justices Frankfurter and Jackson dissenting on
the same ground as their dissent in Screws17 1 this time they were

joined by Justice Minton.17 7 The Court in Monroe v. Pape7 8 extend-

ed the "pretence" basis to an action for damages under § 1983. aT°
Justice Frankfurter registered a strong dissent.8 0 The Court in Bivens
1
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics"'
extended the "pretence" basis to personal libility actions involving
federal agents, but in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,8 2 the
Court refused to extend this basis to the federal agency employing
them. 3
In 1988 the Court in West v. Atkins3 84 extended the "pretence" basis
to a § 1983 action for cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, against a private physician employed by a state
prison. 8 5 Just seven years prior, in Polk County v. Dodson,8 8 the
Court denied a similar right of action against a public defender.387
In United States v. Classic, 8 state election officials were indicted 3for
89
violation of Section 20 of the Criminal Code of the United States,
which made it a penal offense for anyone "acting under color of any law"
to willfully subject or cause any citizen of the United States to be
subjected to deprivation of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by
the laws and Constitution of the United States. Specifically, state
election officials were charged with failure to count the votes actually
cast in a state election, alteration of the ballots, and false certification
of the number of votes actually cast for the candidates, a violation of the
applicable Louisiana statutes. 390 The Supreme Court held that those
acts "were committed in the course of their performance of duties under

375.

341 U.S. 70 (1951).

376.
377.

Screws, 325 U.S. at 134 (Frankfurter and Jackson, JJ., dissenting).
Williams, 341 U.S. at 104 (Frankfurter, Jackson, and Minton, JJ., dissenting).

378. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
379.
380.

Id. at 167.
Id. at 138 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes 433-36.

381. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
382. 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
383.

Id. at 66.

384. 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
385. West, 487 U.S. at 57.
386. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
387.

Dodson, 454 U.S. at 324-25.

388.

313 U.S. 299 (1941).

389. 18 U.S.C. §§ 51, 52 (presently 18 U.S.C. § 242).
390. Classic, 313 U.S. at 307.
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the Louisiana statute," and hence, 391 were "willfully inflicted by those
acting under color of any law, statute and the like."3 92 Justice Harlan
Fiske Stone, writing for the five member majority,393 said:
The alleged acts of appellees were committed in the course of their
performance of duties under the Louisiana statute requiring them to
count the ballots, to record the result of the count, and to certify the
result of the election. Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law
and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with394the
authority of state law, is action taken under "color of" state law.
Three Justices dissented.39 5
In Screws the Court reversed the conviction of state police officers
396
under the same Section 20 of the Criminal Code of the United States
because the jury was improperly instructed on the issue of defendants'
intent. 97 Specifically, they were charged with savagely beating a man
of African descent 395 -using excessive force in making an otherwise
lawful arrest. The Court first clarified something that was not made
clear in Classic:? "[hie who acts under 'color' of law may be a federal
officer or a state officer, he may act under 'color' of federal law or of state
law," the actor may be subject to criminal penalties,"' predating by
twenty-six years a similar ruling in connection with civil penalties.4 '
In deciding that the police officers acted "under color of" state law, the
Court emphasized that "[here the state officers were authorized to make
an arrest and to take such steps as were necessary to make the arrest
effective.40 2 They acted without authority only in the sense that they

391. Id. at 325-26.
392. Id. at 329.
393. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes took no part in the consideration or decision
of the case. Id. at 328.
394. Id. at 325-26.
395. Id. at 329 (Douglas, Black, and Murphy, JJ., dissenting). Justice Douglas, joined
by Justices Hugo Black and Frank Murphy (who on Feb. 3, 1939, as Attorney General,
created the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department), wrote a dissenting opinion
in which he thought that Congress should not, and could not, specify crimes in the field of
state "primary elections." Id. at 326, 341.
396. 18 U.S.C. § 88 (presently 18 U.S.C. § 242).
397. Screws, 325 U.S. at 112-13.
398. Described by Justice Douglas as a "shocking and revolting episode in law
enforcement." Screws, 325 U.S. at 92.

399. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
400.
401.

Screws, 325 U.S. at 108.
See infra text accompanying notes 437-42 dealing with Bivens, 403 U.S. 388

(1971).
402.

Screws, 325 U.S. at 111.
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The case
used excessive force in making the arrest effective."" 3
marked the beginning of the debate, which continues to this day,40 4 on
whether the phrase "under color of" applies to the issue of the "state
actor's" guilt solely by virtue of their abuse or misuse of otherwise valid
authority from the sovereign.40 5
Justice William 0. Douglas announced the judgment of the Court
reversing defendants' conviction and remanding the case for a new
trial.4 "6 He wrote a plurality opinion 0. in which he categorized this
type of behavior as acting under "pretense" of law. He said:
It is clear that under "color" of law means under "pretense" of law.
Thus acts of officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits are plainly
excluded. Acts of officers who undertake to perform their official duties
are included whether they hew to the line of their authority or overstep
it. If, as suggested, the statute was designed to embrace only action
which the State in fact authorized, the words "under color of any law"
were hardly apt words to express the idea.408
Justice Rutledge, in a concurring opinion slightly longer than the
plurality opinion,40 9 took the position that Congress lacked the power
to pass a statute denouncing as a federal crime
the intentional and wrongful taking of an individual's life or liberty by
a state official acting in abuse of his official function and applying to
the deed all the power of his office. This is the ultimate purport of the
notions that state action is not involved and that the crime is against
the state alone.410
But for that conclusion, he would have voted to affirm the judgment.4 11
Justice Murphy dissented because he believed that the judgment of
conviction should be affirmed.412 Justice Roberts, joined by Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson, wrote a dissenting opinion. 4 " They thought

403. Id.
404. See supra note 350.
405. Screws, 325 U.S. at 111.
406. Id. at 91.
407. He was joined by Chief Justice Stone, and Justices Black and Reed. Id. at 92.
408. Id. at 111. This is an apparent conflict with Justice Potter Stewart's opinion in
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1966), an 18 U.S.C. § 241 case ("rights under the
Equal Protection Clause itself arise only where there has been involvement of the State or
of one acting under the color of its authority." Id. (emphasis added)).
409. Screws, 325 U.S. at 113-34.
410. Id. at 133.
411. Id. at 138-60.
412. Id. at 134 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
413. Id. at 138 (Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson, JJ., dissenting).
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that the judgment should have been reversed absolutely rather than
sending the case back for a new trial.414 In their view "under color of'
does not cover the situation of a deprivation of rights by police officers
who misuse or abuse their authority.4 1
In Williams v. United States,416 a private detective, who held a
special police officer's card issued by the Miami, Florida Police Department, was prosecuted under Section 20 of the Federal Criminal
Code.4" 7 He, along with a police officer, obtained a confession from a
suspected thief by beating, threats, and "unmerciful" punishment for
4" 9 and Screws,4 2 ° the
Based primarily on Classic
several hours.4"'
Court determined that defendant was acting "under color of state
law."421 Justice William 0. Douglas, writing for a five-member majority,422 said:
this was an investigation conducted under the aegis of the State, as
evidenced by the fact that a regular police officer was detailed to attend
it ....

[Pletitioner was no mere interloper but had a semblance of

policeman's power from Florida. There was, therefore, evidence that
he acted under authority of Florida law; and the manner of his conduct

414.

Id.

415. Id. at 138-61. Justice Roberts wrote that
[w]e are asked to construe legislation which was intended to effectuate prohibitions against the States for defiance of the Constitution, to be equally applicable
where a State duly obeys the Constitution, but an officer flouts State law and is
unquestionably subject to punishment by the State for his disobedience... Such
a distortion of federal power devised against recalcitrant State authority never
entered the minds of the proponents of the legislation.
Id. at 142 (Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson, JJ., dissenting). Sixteen years later Justice
Frankfurter wrote his monumental dissent in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (see
infra text accompanying notes 432-36) taking the same position.
416. 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
417. 18 U.S.C. § 52 (1940) (presently 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000)).
418. Williams, 341 U.S. at 99.
419. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
420. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
421. Williams, 341 U.S. at 127.
422. The majority consisted of Chief Justice Stone and Justices Douglas, Reed, Burton,
and Clark. Justices Black, Jackson, and Minton dissented. In a case decided the same
day, Justice Frankfurter wrote a plurality opinion (Chief Justice Stone, and Justices
Frankfurter, Jackson, and Minton were in the plurality; Black concurred only) stating that
despite an allegation that defendants acted "under color of state law," an indictment under
18 U.S.C. § 241 against a member of a city police force and employees of a private
corporation for extorting confessions against fellow employees was insufficient to charge
an offense under that statute since it does not extend protection to rights which the federal
Constitution merely guarantees against abridgement by the states. See United States v.
Williams, 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
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of the interrogations makes clear that he was asserting the42authority
granted him and not acting in the role of a private person. 1
The private police officer, being a "state actor," was convicted under
the criminal statute 18 U.S.C.
§ 242, and the conviction was affirmed by
424
five members of the Court.
In Monroe v. Pape,425 at 5:45 on the morning of October 29, 1958,
thirteen members of the Chicago police force, without a search warrant,
broke into the Monroes' apartment, subjected them to a series of racial
indignities because of their African descent, ransacked their residence,
and took Mr. Monroe into custody for several hours. He sued under
§ 1983.426 The Supreme Court held that the officers violated Mr.
Monroe's Fourth Amendment rights based upon the law proclaimed by
the Court in the Classic, 427 Screws,428 and Williams 429 cases.43 °
Echoing his opinion in Screws, Justice Douglas wrote for the majority:
There can be no doubt at least since Ex parte Virginia, that Congress
has the power to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent
it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority
or misuse it .... The question with which we now deal is the

narrower one of whether Congress, in enacting [the precursor to
§ 1983], meant to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional
rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his position
.... We conclude that it did so intend.431

The case is particularly significant43 2 for the dissent of Justice
Frankfurter in which he took the position that "under color of" referred

423. Id. at 99-100.
424. Justice Felix Frankfurter (along with Justices Jackson and Minton) dissented for
the reasons that caused him to join Justice Roberts's dissent in the Screws opinion. Id. at

104.
In a companion case decided the same day, the Court held that a conviction of the same
defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 241 must be reversed even though he was acting "under color
of State law" because the statute applies only to interference with rights that arise from
the relationship between the victim and the federal government. See Williams, 341 U.S.
at 82 ( Douglas, Reed, Burton, and Clark, JJ., dissenting).
425. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
426. Id. at 168. The opinion of the Court does not mention the remedy sought; it was
presumably damages.
427. 313 U.S. 299.
428. 325 U.S. 91.
429. 341 U.S. 97.
430. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187-88.
431. Id. at 171-72 (citations omitted).
432. Justice Powell, concurring in Monell, 436 U.S. at 704, wrote that "[flew cases in
the history of the Court have been cited more frequently than Monroe v. Pape .

. . ."

Id.
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only to "official capacity" and not to personal liability actions.433 He
wrote that legislative history establishes that Congress did not intend
for the term "under color of" to be applied to activities conducted under
"pretense of [state] authority."434 He has some supporters, 43 5 and his
apostasy lingers.436
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
437
agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics "acting under
Narcotics,
color of [federal] authority"438 entered Mr. Bivens's apartment, mangled him in front of his wife and children, arrested him, and threatened
to arrest his family; he was taken to a federal courthouse and stripsearched. Bivens sued the agents in federal court, seeking $15,000
damages under the Fourth Amendment, and alleging that the arrest was
effected without a warrant or probable cause and by the use of unreasonable force. 43 9 The Supreme Court, in review of the case, held for the
first time that there was an implied private action 440 for damages

433. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 238-39.
434. Id.
435. Notable academic commentators have taken the position that Monroe was wrong.
See David Achtenberg, A Milder Measure of Villany: The Unknown History of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and the Meaning of 'Under Color of Law, 1 UTAH L. REV. 1, 53 n.401 (1999). It

would seem that five Justices of the Supreme Court (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall,
Stevens, and White), in Lugar, 457 U.S. 922, took that position, at least as to prejudgment
attachment cases. See infra text accompanying notes 673-82.
436. In 1998 the Supreme Court decided Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998),
a § 1983 case, though one having nothing to do with the meaning of "under color of" or
"state action;" the issue in Crawford-Elwas whether § 1983 plaintiffs are required to prove
elements of their case by clear and convincing evidence, which the Court decided in the
negative. The case is significant to this Article, however, because of the dissent of Justice
Scalia, joined in by Justice Thomas, in which he said that Monroe v. Pape was incorrectly
decided. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 611 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting). He wrote that
the case converted
an 1871 statute concerning constitutional violations committed "undercolorof any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State ...into a statute
covering constitutional violations committed without the authority of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State, and indeed even constitutional violations committed in stark violation of state civil or criminal law."
Id. at 611 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting). Though his only mention of Frankfurter's
dissent in Monroe was a citation acknowledgment, it would appear that two sitting Justices
of the Supreme Court, Scalia and Thomas, agree with Frankfurter to the effect that "under
color of" is applicable only to "official capacity" and not "personal capacity" cases.
437. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
438. Id. at 389.
439. Id. at 390.
440.

The Court in CorrectionalServices Corp. v.Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 67 (2001), opined

that it was "implied" because the Fourth Amendment (the constitutional provision involved
in the case) does not expressly provide for the remedy. The Court in Bivens acknowledged
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against a federal officer alleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional
rights while acting "under color of federal law."44 '
Justice Brennan, in the Court's opinion, stated:
The mere invocation of federal power by a federal law enforcement
official will normally render futile any attempt to resist an unlawful
entry or arrest by resort to the local police; and a claim of authority to
enter is likely to unlock the door as well ....

In such cases there is no

safety for the citizen, except in the protection of the judicial tribunals,
for rights w[hlich have been invaded by the officers of the government,
professing to act in its name. 42
Three Justices dissented.4 4'
In Polk County v. Dodson,44 4 a prisoner in the State of Iowa brought
a § 1983 action in federal court against Polk County, Iowa, a public
defender assigned to his case, and several other defendants. The
allegations against the public defender were that she failed to properly
445
represent the prisoner in his appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the question of whether
a public defender acts "under color of state law" when providing legal
representation to an indigent client." 6 The Court was faced with the
issue vel non of whether the functions of a public defender constitute
acting under color of law. 447 The Court answered the question before
it in the negative based on the following factors: (1) a public defender

that "the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide for the enforcement by
an award of money damages for the consequence of its violation." Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
441. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 398. Though the courts have not acknowledged it, this ruling
must have changed the appellation "state actor" to "sovereign actor."
442. Id. at 394-95.
443. Id. at 411 (Burger, C.J., Black and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). Chief Justice
Burger dissented primarily on separation of powers principles. He said that "Congress
should develop an administrative or quasi-judicial remedy against the government itself
to afford compensation and restitution for persons whose Fourth Amendment rights have
been violated." Id. at 422. Justice Black wrote that "[a]lthough congress has created...
a cause of action against state officials acting under color of state law, it has never created
such a cause of action against federal officials." Id. at 427. Justice Blackmun foresaw a
plethora of suits against federal officers. Id. at 430.
444. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
445. Id. at 314.
446. Id. at 317.
447. In Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 54 (1992), Justice Blackmun stated that in
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), the Court held that a public defender, in making
personnel decisions on behalf of the state, is a state actor. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 54. That
does not appear to be the holding of the Branti case.
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is an officer of the court;44 (2) though paid by the State, "a public
defender is not amenable to administrative direction in the same sense
as other state employees;"4 49 (3) the State is obligated to respect the
4
professional independence of the public defenders whom it engages; 50
and (4) "[a]lthough a defense attorney has a duty to advance all colorable
claims and defenses, the canons of professional ethics impose limits on

permissible advocacy.451
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. emphasized the Court's narrow holding
with the following words: "[A] public defender does not act under color
of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel
to a defendant in a criminal proceeding." 452 One Justice dissented." 3
In West v.Atkins45 4 an inmate at a North Carolina state prisonhospital sued a private physician who was under contract with the state
to provide part-time orthopedic services to prisoners because they were
prohibited from using physicians of their choice. The suit was brought
in federal district court, presumably for damages455 pursuant to
§ 1983, alleging that plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights to be free from
cruel and unusual treatment had been violated.45 6 The case was
brought under the Eighth Amendment, but because the Fourteenth
Amendment was another ground for relief plaintiff had to prove that the
"state actor" (doctor) acted "under color of state law." 5 7 The Court was
unanimous in concluding that such requirement was met.458
Justice Blackmun,4 59 writing for the Court, stated:

448. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 318.
449. Id. at 321.
450. Id. at 321-22.
451. Id. at 323.
452. Id. at 325.
453. Id. at 328 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun dissented because he
thought that the Court had ignored its prior decisions on "under color of," which are
discussed in this paper. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
454. 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
455. The opinion does not reveal the remedy sought.
456. West, 487 U.S. at 45.
457. Id. at 48-49.
458. Id. at 57-58. The Court distinguished the doctor here from the lawyer in Polk
County, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), in that the relationship between the state employer and the
employee lawyer representing his client in Dodson was adversarial; whereas the
relationship between the state employer and the employee doctor caring for his patient
here was one of "'close cooperation and coordination' in a 'joint effort.'" Id. at 51.
459. Justice Blackmun was the lone dissenter in Polk County v. Dodson (holding that
a public defender representing an indigent client was not acting "under color of"). 454 U.S.
312, 328.
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The fact that the State employed respondent pursuant to a contractual
arrangement that did not generate the same benefits or obligations
applicable to other "state employees" does not alter the analysis. It is
the physician's function within the state system, not the precise terms
of his employment, that determines whether his actions can fairly be
attributed to the State. Whether a physician is on the State payroll or
is paid by contract, the dispositive issue concerns the relationship
among the State, the physician, and the prisoner. Contracting out
prison medical care does not relieve the State of its constitutional duty
to provide adequate medical treatment to those in its custody, and it
does not deprive the State's prisoners of the means to vindicate their
Eighth Amendment rights.46
In CorrectionalServices Corp. v. Malesko,4 61 the most recent case the
Supreme Court has decided concerning "under color of," a federal
offender, who was serving time in a privately operated "halfway house"
under contract with the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and therefore,
"acting under color of federal law," was injured by the negligence of one
of its personnel. The offender sued the operator of the "halfway house"
in federal court and sought damages.462 The Supreme Court considered the suit as one requesting an extension of the "implied damages
action first recognized in Bivens ... to allow recovery against a private
463
The rationale of the
corporation . . ." which the Court refused to do.
to deter the officer,
is
of
Bivens
"the
purpose
Court's judgment was that
federal agencies
claim
against
a
Bivens
"to
allow
not the agency," and
'would mean the evisceration of the Bivens remedy, rather than its
Four Justices dissented.465
extension.""'4

460. West, 487 U.S. at 55-56.
461. 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
462. Id. at 65.
463. Id. at 63.
464. Id. at 69.
465. Id. at 75 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Bryer, JJ., dissenting). Justice Stevens,
with whom Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer joined, dissented primarily on the ground
that the Court extended Bivens in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980), to a violation
of Eighth Amendment rights by prison officials despite the absence of a federal statute.
There was no reason here not to further the extension to a corporation, which although
privately owned, was employed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Particularly because the
Court in FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 473-76 (1994), drew a distinction between "federal
agents" and "federal agencies."
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2. 46 6 Sub-Type II-B--State Actor merely follows edict of the Sovereign
There has been little controversy among the Justices in the Court's
rulings concerning "under color of' or "state action" in sub-type II-B
cases in which the "state actor" merely follows some directive of the
sovereign. In one year 417 the Court considered three cases involving
attempts by people of African descent to be served in public eating
establishments. 48" All nine Justices were in agreement in determining
"state action" in Peterson v. City of Greenville469 in which the "state
actor" was following a city ordinance prohibiting integration of races in
470
places of public accommodation. In Lombard v. State of Louisiana,
eight Justices discovered "state action" by virtue of a statement
proclaiming segregation prepared by the Mayor of New Orleans. One
4 72
all nine
In Robinson v. State of Florida,
Justice dissented.47 '
gave
which
statute
a
state
in
present
was
action
Justices held that state
be
to
thought
he
person
any
to
remove
the
right
a restaurant manager
47 3
Adickes
in
Justices
seven
Robinson,
after
years
Six
"detrimental."
475
of non-integration of
v. S.H. Kress & Co. 474 noted that a custom
to establish "state
sufficient
was
counter
lunch
races at a public
77
476
'
dissented.
Justices
Two
action.
In Blum v. Yaretsky,475 seven Justices concluded that no "state
action" had been established in a case involving reduction of care
furnished to Medicaid patients because, even though the State regulated

466. Actually, in these cases the state actor is not pretending to use the authority of
the state in an abusive manner, i.e., misusing it, he is merely following an edict of the
state.
467. Between May 20, 1963, (on which the Court decided two of the cases) and June
22, 1964.
468. Garner v. Louisiana,368 U.S. 157, 163 (1961) predated these cases by two years,
but in Garner the Court was not required to determine the "broader" constitutional
question of "state action," vel non, as it determined that the conviction of people of African
descent for disturbing the peace without any evidence to support it violated their due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 163-64.
469. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
470. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
471. Lombard, 373 U.S. at 248 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
472. 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
473. Id. at 154.
474. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
475. See supra notes 213-22.
476. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 213.
477. Id. at 213, 234.
478. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
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the care facility in which plaintiff was located, none of those regulations
dictated the alleged deprivation.4 7 9
In Peterson v. City of Greenville,40 boys and girls of African descent
seated themselves at a public lunch counter in a store in Greeneville,
South Carolina, expecting to be served. When the store manager called
the police and announced that the lunch counter was closed, the boys
and girls remained and were arrested for trespass. They were convicted
under an ordinance that followed the local custom of segregating races
at lunch counters. The boys and girls brought an action against the city
alleging that they were denied their First Amendment right of free
speech and their equal protection of laws secured to them against "state
action" by the Fourteenth Amendment.4 8' The Supreme Court unanimously held that even though the prosecution originated with the
restaurant's proprietor, a private person, the local ordinance requiring
the segregation of races in such places as the restaurant was tantamount to the state having "commanded a particular result."482
Chief Justice Warren's unanimous opinion stated:
When the State has commanded a particular result, it has saved to
itself the power to determine that result and thereby "to a significant
extent" has "become involved" in it, and, in fact, has removed that
decision from the sphere of private choice. It has thus effectively
determined that a person owning, managing or controlling an eating
place is left with no choice of his own but must segregate his white and
Negro patrons. The [operator of the lunch counter], in deciding to
exclude Negroes, did precisely what the city law required.4"3
Lombard v. State of Louisiana44 is remarkably similar to Peterson
v. City of Greenville,4 8 decided the same day, except that the City of
New Orleans, in which the event occurred, had no ordinance prohibiting
the segregation of races in public restaurants, as existed in Peterson, but
rather a public statement of the Mayor to that effect. 486 Chief Justice
Warren's opinion4 87 stated:

479. Id. at 1012.

480. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).

This case was decided the same day as Lombard v.

Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, see infra text accompanying notes 484-89.

481. Peterson, 373 U.S. at 247.
482. Id. at 248.
483. Id.

484. 373 U.S. 267.
485.
486.

Peterson, 373 U.S. at 248.
Lombard, 373 U.S. at 268.

487.

Justice Douglas concurred in an opinion in which he stressed the "interdepen-

dence" of Burton (see infra text accompanying notes 518-20, 524-30), which he referred to

as being "involved to a 'significant extent.'" Lombard, 373 U.S. at 274-83.
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Equally the State cannot achieve the same result by an official
command which has at least as much coercive effect as an ordinance.
The official command here was to direct continuance of segregated
service in restaurants, and to prohibit any conduct directed toward its
discontinuance; it was not restricted solely to preserve the public peace
in a nondiscriminatory fashion in a situation where violence was
present or imminent by reason of public demonstrations. Therefore,
here, as in Peterson, these convictions, commanded as they were by the
voice of the State directing segregated service at the restaurant, cannot
stand."'

One Justice dissented.8 9
4 9 ° the conviction of eighteen persons
In Robinson v. State of Florida,
of African descent was reversed by the Supreme Court because a state
statute, which gave managers of restaurants the "right to remove or
cause to be removed any person 'who, in the opinion of the management,
is a person whom it would be detrimental' to the restaurant to serve"
constituted "state action."49 1 Justice Black wrote in the unanimous
opinion that: "[T]he State through its regulations has become involved
to such a significant extent in bringing about restaurant segregation
that appellants' trespass convictions must be said to reflect492that state
policy and therefore to violate the Fourteenth amendment."
In Adickes u. S.H. Kress & Co. 493 a Caucasian teacher, who was
denied service by a restaurant and arrested for vagrancy because she
was in the company of her students of African descent, sued the operator
of the restaurant under § 1983, alleging that she had been deprived of
her constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 49 4 The Supreme Court, in reversing a summary
judgment for defendants, based its decision on the principle that even
though there may not have been a state statute forbidding Caucasians
495
and people of African descent to eat together in public restaurants,
such was the custom in the State of Mississippi at the time of the
incident in question. 49 ' The custom or usage, moreover, was not just

488. Id. at 273-74.
489. Id. at 255 (Harlan, J., dissenting). While Justice Harlan agreed with the majority
in Peterson (see supra note 480), he would have reversed this case so that "the issue of state
action may be properly explored." Id.
490. 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
491. Id. at 154 n.1.
492. Id. at 156-57.
493. 398 U.S. 144.
494.

Id. at 146.

495. As there was in Peterson. See supra note 480.
496. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 173.
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that of some Mississippi residents; it had become so recognized and
49 7
widespread that it might as well have been the law of the state.
Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote: "The involvement of a state
official .. .plainly provides the state action essential to show a direct
violation of petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment... rights, whether or
49
In
not the actions of the police were officially authorized or lawful."
499
quoting from Justice Frankfurter, written in another context,
Harlan said:
It would be a narrow conception of jurisprudence to confine the
notion of "laws" to what is found written on the statute books, and to
disregard the gloss which life has written upon it. Settled state practice
...can establish what is state law. The equal protection clause did
not write an empty formalism into the Constitution. Deeply embedded
traditional ways of carrying out state policy, such as those of which
petitioner complains, are often tougher and truer law than the dead
words of the written text.5"9
[A] State is responsible for the . . .act of a private party when the

State, by its law, has compelled the act ....0'
For state action purposes it makes no difference of course whether
the racially discriminatory act by the private party is compelled by a
statutory provision or by a custom having the force of law-in either
case it is the State that has commanded the result by its law. Without
deciding whether less substantial involvement of a State might satisfy
the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, we
conclude that petitioner would show an abridgement of her equal
protection right, if she proves that [the restaurant] refused her service

497. Id. at 167.
Congress included customs and usages within its definition of law in § 1983
because of the persistent and widespread discriminatory practices of state officials
in some areas of the post-bellum South ....Although not authorized by written
law, such practices of state officials could well be so permanent and well settled
as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law.
Id. at 167-68. It must be shown that the state actor was aware of the custom or law Id.
at 162 n.23. It was said in Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404
(1997), that "an act performed pursuant to a 'custom' that has not been formally approved
by an appropriate decision maker may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the
theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law."
498. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152. There was a police officer in the restaurant at the time
of the refusal to serve the teacher, and he was the one who arrested her. Id. at 156-57.
499. See Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940).
500. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 168.
501. Id. at 170.
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because of a state-enforced custom of segregating the races in public
restaurants ....502
Because the core of congressional concern in enacting § 1983 was to
provide a remedy for violations of the Equal Protection Clause arising
from racial discrimination, we think that a private person who
discriminates on the basis of race with the knowledge of and pursuant
to a state-enforced custom requiring such discrimination is a participant in joint activity with the State and is acting "under color of" that
custom for purposes of § 1983.503

Two Justices dissented.5 °4
In Blum v. Yaretsky, °5 nursing home residents, who were recipients
of Medicaid assistance, brought an action under the Fourteenth
Amendment against state officials responsible for administering the
Medicaid program of the State of New York. The residents claimed that
the nursing home's decision to transfer them to a lower level of care
without notice deprived them of their rights to due process. 06 The
Supreme Court held that plaintiffs had failed to establish "state
action." °7 Despite extensive regulations by the state, the regulations
do not "dictate the decision to discharge or transfer in a particular
case,"508 and the decision in question was made not by state officials
but by physicians and nursing home administrators, all private

502. Id. at 171.
503. Id. at 174 n.44.
504. Id. at 188 (Brennan and Douglas, JJ., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Douglas
dissented in part to voice their disagreement with the Court's interpretation of what is
meant by "custom or usage" as it is used in § 1983. Justice Brennan wrote that "[tihe
Court has never held or even intimated, that 'custom or usage' means 'law.'" Id. at 213-14.
Justice Douglas thought that the "custom" of a State includes its "unwritten commitment,
stronger than ordinances, statutes and regulations, by which men live and arrange their
lives." Id. at 181. Justice Douglas wrote that "[i]t is time we stopped being niggardly in
construing civil rights legislation. It is time we kept up with Congress and construed its
laws in the full amplitude needed to rid their enforcement of the lingering tolerance for
racial discrimination that we sanction today." Id. at 188. See supra the discussion of
"custom or usage" in text accompanying notes 161, 213-22.
505. 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (decided the same day as Rendell-Baker and Lugar).
506. Id. at 993.
507. Id. at 992, 997-98. The Court reiterated the position taken in Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335, 342 n.6 (1980), to the effect that the question of what is "state action" is one
of law.
508. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1010.
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persons. 0 9 There was no "state action" because there was no exercise
of "coercive power" by the state.
Justice Rehnquist wrote: "We conclude that respondents have failed
to establish 'state action' in the nursing homes' decision to discharge or
transfer Medicaid patients to lower levels of care. Consequently, they
have failed to prove that petitioners have violated rights secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment." s ° Two Justices dissented. 11
conspires or has a "symbiotic"relation3. Sub-7ype Il-C--State actor
512
ship with those in authority
Before deprivation can be found in these cases, a close relationship
must be established. This relationship is referred to as "interdependence" or "symbiosis" between the state and the "state actor."51 The
Court has been unanimous in two such cases. In United States v.
Price, 4 some private citizens joined police officers in brutalizing the
deprived persons. 1 5 In Dennis v. Sparks,"' those who willingly
conspired with a state judge did so "under color of" state law. 17
In Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority,"' six Justices concluded
there was "state action" because of a condition of "interdependence"

509. Id. at 1006, 1009. The Court stated that "there is no suggestion that those
decisions were influenced in any degree by the State's obligation to adjust benefits to
conformity with charges in the cost of medically necessary care." Id. at 1005. Polk County
v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (see supra text accompanying notes 340-47).
510. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1012.
511. Id. (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Justice Brennan, with whom Justice
Marshall agreed, thought that the State of New York had delegated a "public function."
He wrote that
[tihe State has set forth precisely the standards upon which the level-of-care
determinations are to be made, and has delegated administration of the program
to the nursing home operators, rather than assume the burden of administering
the program itself. Thus, not only does the program implement the State's fiscal
goals, but, to paraphrase the Court, '[tihese requirements ... make the State
responsible for actual decisions to discharge or transfer particular patients...'
Where, as here, a private party acts on behalf of the State to implement state
policy, his action is state action.
Id. at 1027.
512. In these cases it is immaterial whether the state actor is misusing or abusing the
authority of the state. Liability is imposed because of the close relationship with the state.
513. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 795 n.7 (1966).
514. 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
515. Id. at 790.
516. 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
517. Id. at 27-28.
518. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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between the "state actor" and an entity of the state from which it rented
space.519 Three Justices thought the conclusion of "state action" was
premature until the basis of the state supreme court's reversal of
plaintiff's case was revealed 2 0° In another case, Moose Lodge No. 107
v.Irvis,521 six Justices held that there was no "state action" when a
private club refused service on the basis
of race to an invitee of one of its
523
members. 22 Three Justices dissented.
In Burton a man of African descent brought an action in state court
against the operator of a restaurant and the Wilmington Delaware
Parking Authority ("Parking Authority"), which leased space in its offstreet parking building to the operator of the restaurant. The action
sought declaratory and injunctive relief for termination for deprivation
of plaintiff's equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
by refusing to serve him solely because of his race. It was undisputed
that the Parking Authority was a "public body corporate and politic" and
that the restaurant was operated by a private entity. 4 The Supreme
Court, while recognizing the dichotomy between State discriminatory
action and private discriminatory action,525 held that the "interdependence"5 26 between the private restaurant operator and the public
Parking Authority caused the private operator's discrimination to be
state action that violated the Fourteenth Amendment.5 27 While the
Court acknowledged that the factual record was incomplete, the
following examples of the "interdependence" through benefits received
were revealed: the lease was beneficial to the city in order to attain
revenue to meet construction costs of the building; the restaurant, to
some extent, enjoyed the Authority's tax exemption; the Authority
furnished heat, gas service, and extensive repair service; and the
Authority had the right to28 adopt regulations for the operation of the
restaurant, among others.

519. Id. at 725.
520. The dissenters, Justices Harlan, Frankfurter, and Whittaker apparently did not
consider it necessary to voice their position about the meaning of "state action" until the
state supreme court had clarified its ruling.
521. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
522. Id. at 177.
523. Id. at 179. See infra note 551.
524. Burton, 365 U.S. at 717.
525. To the effect that private discrimination is tolerated while public discrimination
is not. See supra text accompanying notes 5-12.
526. That "interdependence" was labeled "symbiotic" by Justice Rehnquist in Moose
Lodge, 407 U.S. at 175, and in Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357.
527. Burton, 365 U.S. at 718-25.
528. Id. at 723.
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Justice Tom Clark wrote that the Parking Authority had so far
"insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the restaurant
owner] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged
activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to have been so
'purely private' as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment."529 Three Justices dissented.5 30
In United States v. Price,53 ' fifteen men, along with a sheriff, a
deputy sheriff, and a patrolman, were the subject of federal indictments
under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for the murder of three men. The victims had
been released from jail by defendants so that they could be apprehended
again and brutalized, willfully depriving them of their Fourteenth
Amendment rights, privileges, and immunities.5 32 The defense of the
fifteen men, to the effect that they were not acting "under color of law,"
was discredited by the Court, noting that the "state action" required by
the Fourteenth Amendment was identical to the "under color of law" of
§ 1983 and that "under color of law means the same thing in § 242 that
it does in its civil counterpart, 42 U.S.C. § 1983." 533 Justice Abe Fortas
wrote the unanimous opinion of the Court:
Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited
action, are acting "under color" of law for purposes of the statute. To
act "under color" of law does not require that the accused be an officer
of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint
activity with the State or its agents.3 4
Those who took advantage of participation by state officers in
accomplishment of the foul purpose alleged must suffer the consequenc-

529.

Id. at 725. Chief Justice Rehnquist in American ManufacturersMutual Insurance

Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 57 (1999), said "Burton was one of our early cases dealing with
'state action' under the Fourteenth Amendment, and later cases have refined the vague
'joint participation' test embodied in that case." He was referring particularly to Blum, 457
U.S. 991 (1982), and Jackson, 419 U.S. 345.
530. Id. at 728 (Harlan and Whittaker, JJ., dissenting). Justice Harlan thought that
the Court's ruling was premature, in that there should have been a determination of the
Delaware Supreme Court's ruling before the U.S. Supreme Court determined "state action"
vel non. Id. at 728-39 (Harlan and Whittaker, JJ., dissenting). If that court interpreted
the state statute as authorizing discrimination based exclusively on race it was
constitutionally infirm; if its interpretation was to the effect that, as at common law, the
restaurant was free to serve whomever it pleased, there was no constitutional problem.
Id. at 728-29. Justice Whitaker specifically agreed. Justice Frankfurter was basically in
agreement that the Court's ruling on "state action" was premature. Id. at 727.
531. 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
532. The offense presumably was racially motivated although the Court's opinion does
not explicitly state.
533. Price, 383 U.S. at 794 n.7.
534. Id. at 794.
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es of that participation. In effect, if the allegations are true, they were
in willful concert with state
participants in official lawlessness, acting
5 35
officers and hence under color of law.
In the present case, the participation by law enforcement officers, as
and it is therefore
alleged in the indictment, is clearly state action ...
36
within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 5 1 a person of African descent, who
was refused service at a private club5 . in Pennsylvania while a guest
of a member, brought a § 1983 action seeking to have the state liquor
license of the club revoked because its refusal to serve him constituted
"state action," depriving him of his Fourteenth Amendment equal rights
protection.5 3 9 The Court held that the actions of the club did not
constitute "state action." 40 The Court distinguished Burton on the
basis that there was no evidence of a "symbiotic" relationship.54 '
Though the State Liquor Control Board made several regulations
concerning the sale of alcoholic beverages, those rules had nothing to do
conducts
with the membership or guest policies of the club;5 42 the54club
3
itself.
club
the
by
owned
building
a
in
activities
its
of
all
Deemphasizing the effect of any benefit received from the State by the
"state actor 544 or any regulations made by the state, Justice Rehnquist
wrote for six members of the Court545 that: "The Court has never held
that discrimination by an otherwise private entity would be violative
...
of the Equal Protection Clause if the private entity receives any sort of
benefit or service at all from the State, or if it is subject to state
regulation in any degree whatsoever."54 6 The Court, having eschewed

535. Id. at 795.
536. Id. at 799-800.
537. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
538. A local branch of a national fraternal organization.
539. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 179.
540. Id. at 177.
541. Id. at 175.
542. Id. For similar pronouncements of the Court see Blum, 457 U.S. 991, and RendelUBaker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). State regulation, however, was an element considered
by the Court in Robinson, 378 U.S. 153.
543. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 171. In Burton, 365 U.S. 715, the restaurant where the
deprivation occurred was operated in leased premises.
544. The Court pointed out that the "private entity" receives such "state-furnished
services" as "electricity, water, and police and fire protection.. ." Moose Lodge, 407 U.S.
at 173.
545. Id. at 179-90 (Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
546. Id. at 173. He described the situation in Burton as "the private lessee obtained
the benefit of locating in a building owned by the state-created parking authority .... "
Id. at 175. See infra text accompanying notes 557-77 concerning benefit received by the
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both state-benefit and regulated bases, attempted to discover an
involvement between the state and the club (as in Burton54 7) and
concluding no involvement existed, ruled that there was no actionable
deprivation of rights on the part of the club (i.e., "state action") because
the state had not "significantly involved itself" with the club. s 8
Quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 49 Justice Rehnquist wrote that "[w]here
the impetus for the discrimination is private, the State must have
'significantly involved itself with invidious discrimination.' ' s0 Three
Justices dissented. 551
Dennis v. Sparks552 was a § 1983 action seeking damages against a
state court judge and others for having conspired to bribe the judge in
order to obtain an injunction.553 The Supreme Court held that dismissal of the charges against the judge on absolute immunity
grounds5 54 would not prevent a finding that those who cooperated with
the judge did so "under color of" law.555 Justice Byron White, writing

state actor from the state.

547.

365 U.S. 715.

548. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 173. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, in
dissent, saw the liquor license as the instrument by which the state became the "active
participant" with the "state actor" at least in the operation of the bar, which in a state
where the dispensation of liquor is strictly enforced is of considerable weight. Id. at 179-90
(Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
549. 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967).
550. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 173 (adding that if such "necessities of life" as electricity,
water, police, and fire protection were to trigger a finding of state action, the distinction
between "private" and "state conduct" would be emasculated. Id. Justice Rehnquist stated
that with one irrelevant exception "there is no suggestion in this record that the
Pennsylvania statutes and regulations governing the sale of liquor are intended either
overtly or covertly to encourage discrimination. Id. at 176.
551. Id. at 179 (Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Justices Douglas,
Brennan, and Marshall, determined that in a state such as Pennsylvania, which has a
"state store" system of alcohol distribution and liquor can be obtained under highly
regulated conditions, the issuance of a liquor license to a private club makes the state its
active participant in connection with any form of discrimination. Id. at 179-90, particularly
183.
552. 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
553. Id. at 25-26.
554. This doctrine dates back to 1872. See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872);
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553 (1967). In Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 707 (1997), a
§ 1983 case, it was decided that even the President of the United States is not automatically granted an immunity from civil lawsuits based upon his private conduct. Twelve years
after Dennis v. Sparks, in Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 159 (1992), the Court held that
private defendants charged with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability for invoking state pre-judgment
replevin, garnishment, and attachment statutes, later declared unconstitutional, are not
entitled to qualified immunity from suit. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 168-69.
555. Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27.
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for the unanimous Court, dealt mostly with judicial immunity, but
regarding "under color of" he said:
[T]o act "under color of" state law for § 1983 purposes does not require
that the defendant be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a
willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents. Private
persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action,
are acting [I] "under color" of law for purposes of § 1983 actions ....
Private parties who corruptly conspire with a judge in connection with
such conduct are thus acting under color of state law within the
meaning of § 1983 as it has been construed in our prior cases.556
4. Sub-Type II-D--State actor received some "benefit" from the
sovereign557
In these cases, before deprivation is found, it must be established that
the "state actor" received some benefit from the state. The Justices were
unanimous in their determination of "state action" in Norwood v.
Harrison,"' in which a state furnished the use of textbooks to private
schools without any check on whether the school had a policy of racial
discrimination.
Six Justices in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak..9 thought that
a transit company's being a governmentally protected monopoly did not
constitute grounds to enjoin, under the First or Fifth Amendments, its
Two Justices
broadcasting of paid advertisements in its buses." 0
In like vein, six Justices determined that extensive
dissented. 6 '
regulations by the state and the allowance of a privately owned public
utility company to be a monopoly did not cause it to become a "state
in Jackson v. MetropolitanEdison Co.562 Three Justices dissentactor"
5 63
ed.
In Pollak bus passengers claimed that the privately owned but
federally regulated public utility company, Capital Transit Company,
violated the First and Fifth Amendment rights of bus riders by playing

556. Id. at 27-29.
557. In these cases it is immaterial whether or not the state actor misuses or abuses
the authority of the state. Liability is imposed because of the benefit received from the
state by the state actor.
558. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
559. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
560. Id. at 463.
561. Id. at 467 (Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting). See infra note 567.
562. 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974).
563. Id. at 359 (Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). See infra note 577.

2005]

UNDER COLOR OF

629

piped-in music, speeches, "propaganda," and "news" on its buses.564
They sought an injunction against the continuation of the practice.5 65
The Court, in denying relief to plaintiffs, made it clear that the mere
fact that the transit company had received the benefit of being a
governmentally protected monopoly, franchised by Congress, was not
sufficient to constitute "Federal Government action"6 7to invoke the First
66
and Fifth Amendments.1 Two Justices dissented.
Norwood v. Harrison is a case applicable to the Fourteenth
Amendment rather than to the Civil Rights Acts because it deals with
what is impermissible "state action." Parents of some school children in
Mississippi filed a class action to enjoin the continuance of a state
program that loaned textbooks to both public and private schools without
regard as to whether the schools had racially discriminatory policies in
The Supreme Court
violation of their "constitutional rights." 69
observed that there are traditional services furnished by a state (e.g.,
electricity, water, and police protection) that do not constitute a showing
It unanimously
of state involvement with invidious discrimination.7
found "state action" existed in this case, however, and struck the
program down for violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by "significantly aid[ing] the organization and
continuation of a separate system of private schools which ... may
discriminate if they so desire."57'
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,572 a customer brought a
§ 1983 action against a privately owned and operated public utility,
which held a Certificate of Public Convenience from the State of
Pennsylvania, alleging damages due to discriminatory termination of her

564. Pollak, 343 U.S. at 466-67. Justice Frankfurter feeling that he had become a
"victim" of the practice, recused himself from consideration of the case. Id.
565. Id. at 458.
566. Id. at 463. See infra note 461 for another monopoly case.
567. Id. at 467 (Black and Douglass, JJ., dissenting). Justice Black thought that the
broadcasting of speeches and the like would infringe bus passengers' First Amendment
rights. Id. at 466. Justice Douglas, who dissented in Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. 163, dissented
in this case on the ground that by the commission's forcing a captive audience to listen, it
deprived the members of that audience of their liberty interests under the Fourth
Amendment. See supra text accompanying notes 537-38.
568. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
569. Id. at 457.
570. Id. at 465. The Court in Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 173, made the same
observations and, in Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966) (observing that such
services as, e.g., parks, playgrounds, athletic facilities, amphitheaters, museums, and zoos
are furnished by the state).
571. Norwood, 413 U.S. at 467.
572. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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electric services.5 73 The Supreme Court held that the state did not
have a sufficient "connection" with the utility to require a determination
that the termination constituted a "governmentally protected monopoly,"
despite the fact that the utility was extensively regulated.57 4 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated:
The mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by
itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . ."' Approval by a state utility commis-

sion of... a request from a regulated utility, where the commission
has not put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by
ordering it, does not transmute a practice initiated by the utility and
approved by the commission into "state action."576
Three Justices dissented.

7

Actor has been delegated a "publicfunction"
5. Sub-7ype II-E--State
578
by the Sovereign
In Sub-type II-E cases, before the court will find a prohibited
deprivation of rights, it must conclude that the state delegated some
power that is traditionally reserved to the sovereign, a "public function."
This is the area of the law in which most of the cases are litigated, and

573. Id. at 346.
574. Id. at 350-52. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist, by way of dictum, said
that if the state had delegated to the utility some power traditionally associated with
sovereignty, such as eminent domain, the result might be different. Id. at 353. The three
Justices who dissented in Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. 163, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall took
the position that giving a privately owned utility the status of monopoly was the very
factor making the utility a "state actor" and the state actor's action "state action." See id.
at 359-374 (Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
575. Id. at 350.
576. Id. at 357.
577. Id. at 359 (Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Justice Douglas
thought that regulation of such necessities as electricity fits § 1983 "like a glove." Id. at
364. Justice Brennan voiced no opinion on whether "state action" existed in the case. He
agreed that the customer had no claim against the utility company but not for the reasons
espoused by the Court. Id. at 364-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He saw no adjudicable
controversy between the parties. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall agreed
with Justice Brennan on the lack of controversy in the case but took the occasion to
espouse upon "state action." Id. at 365 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Somewhat in line with
Justice Douglas's opinion, Justice Marshall emphasized the government's regulation of such
an important utility as evincing "state action." Id. at 366-79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
578. Actually, in these cases the state actor may or may not misuse or abuse the
authority given him by the state. Liability is imposed because the state actor is performing
some function that is traditionally performed by the state.
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complete unanimity among the Justices deciding them has never
existed.5 79
In Terry v. Adams,5 8 ° the state delegated the handling of an election
to a "state actor," yet there was one dissenting vote based on a perception of no "state action."5"'
82
the Court did not determine
In Gilmore v. City of Montgomery,"
whether the alleged "state actor" (the YM.C.A.) was delegated a "public
function" but remanded the case for the district court to do so.5" 3 Six
Justices ruled in FlaggBros. v. Brooks 4 that a state does not delegate
a "public function" to an alleged "state actor" by proving a "self-help"
provision in its commercial code.5" 5 Three Justices dissented." 6
In Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency, 8 7
six Justices concluded that a land-use authority created by the state
acted "under color of" when it issued its regulations. 8 8 Three Justices
wrote partial dissents.5 89
In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 590 seven Justices narrowed the Court's
interpretation of the "public function" test determining that when the
"public function" (in that case the education of maladjusted students)
has nothing to do with the deprivation of rights, "state action" is
missing.59 ' Two Justices registered dissents.5 92
On the same day that the Court decided Rendell-Baker, five Justices
in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 593 held that the constitutionality of a
prejudgment attachment statute can be challenged under § 1983 because
it permits a "state actor" to act "under color of"' state law in depriving
people of their rights, but a § 1983 action would not lie for "only misuse
or abuse of the statute."9' 4 Four Justices dissented. 595

579.

See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).

580.
581.
582.
583.

345 U.S. 461 (1953).
Id. at 485.
417 U.S. 556 (1974).
Id. at 575-76.

584.

436 U.S. 149 (1978).

585. Id. at 166.
586. Id. at 166 (Marshall, Stevens, and White, JJ., dissenting).
587. 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
588. Id. at 399-400.
589. Id. at 406 (Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). See infra text
accompanying note 669.

590. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
591.
592.
593.
594.

Id. at 843.
Id. at 844 (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissenting). See infra note 679.
457 U.S. 922 (1982).
Id. at 942.
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Five Justices in National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian96
decided that the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") did
not act "under color of" state law when it disciplined a basketball coach
employed by a state university because the state was free to reject those
recommendations.5 97 Four Justices dissented.59
In the span of just over a year, the Court, in two cases, considered
whether the use of peremptory challenges constituted "state action." In
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,599 six members of the Court held
that the exercise of peremptory challenges in a federal discriminatory
case is an unconstitutional violation of a defendant's rights.0 0 Three
Justices dissented.0 1 In Georgia v. McCollum,"2 the Court extended
the Leesville Concrete principle to the improper use of peremptory
challenges
by a defendant in a criminal trial.0 3 Two Justices dissent04
6

ed.

The Court achieved almost complete unanimity in American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan. 5 holding that no "state
action" existed in a state permitting insurers to suspend payments under
certain circumstances because the insurers were under no compulsion
from the state on their manner of handling the claims. 0 6 Justice
Stevens, though generally agreeing with the majority opinion, dissented
from the judgment on a technical point.0 7
In one of the last cases dealing with the meaning of "under color of"
to come before the Court, the now familiar five-four split made its
appearance. In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Ass'n,6' five Justices held that a not-for-profit athletic association, which regulated interscholastic sports among Tennessee public and

595. Id. at 943 (Burger, C.J., Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting). See
infra note 692.
596. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
597. Id. at 198-99.
598. Id. at 199 (White, Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting). See infra
note 699.
599. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
600. Id. at 631.
601. Id. at 631 (O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Scalia, JJ., dissenting). See infra note 699.
602. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
603. Id. at 57.
604. Id. at 62 (O'Connor and Scalia, JJ., dissenting). See infra note 707.
605. 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
606. Id. at 57-58.
607. Id. at 63 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra note 715.
608. 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
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of" state law because it was
private schools, operated "under color
"entertwined" with state government. 6 9 Four Justices dissented.6 10
In Terry v. Adams, 1 the Jaybird Democratic Association was an
entity61 2 that controlled elections in the state of Texas by arranging
that only their members were allowed to run for elective office, and their
membership was restricted to Caucasian registered voters. Everyone
was permitted to vote in the general election, but since only those who
prevailed in the primaries would be on the ballot, people of African
descent had a "Hobson's choice," the right to vote for only Caucasians.61 3 In a suit claiming infringement of Fifteenth Amendment
rights, the Supreme Court's judgment abrogated the Jaybird's arrangement but for no definitive reason.61 4 Justice Black's opinion, announcing the judgment of the Court, did not mention "state action" but got
very close. He wrote:
For a state to permit such a duplication of its election processes is
to permit a flagrant abuse of those processes to defeat the purposes of
the Fifteenth Amendment .... 1 5
It violates the Fifteenth Amendment for a state, by such circumvention, to permit within its borders the use of any device that produces
an equivalent of the prohibited election ......
It is immaterial that the state does not control that part of this
elective process which it leaves for the Jaybirds to manage. The
Jaybird primary has become an integral part, indeed the only effective
process that determines who shall rule and govern
part, of the elective
617
in the county.

Justice Frankfurter, though acknowledging that there was no "state
action" present in the case,616 voted with the majority because he

609. Id. at 302.
610. Id. at 305 (Thomas, Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Scalia, JJ., dissenting). See infra
note 728.
611. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
612. Though they proclaimed themselves a "self-governing voluntary club," id. at 463,
the district court found that they were a "political organization," and the Supreme Court
affirmed. Id. at 470.
613. Id. at 470.
614. There was no majority opinion. The judgment of the Court was announced by
Justice Black joined by Justices Douglas and Burton. Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate
concurring opinion. Justice Clark wrote a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Vinson
and Justices Reed and Jackson joined. Justice Minton dissented.
615. Terry, 345 U.S. at 469.
616. Id.
617. Id.
618. He said that "formal State action, either by way of legislative recognition or official
authorization is wholly wanting." Id. at 471. The state involvement he found in this case
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wanted to overturn the "vice" that he thought the state exhibited. 19
The four-member concurring opinion, drafted by Justice Clark, did not
expound on "state action," 20 but their vote to reverse was based on
what they conceived as the Fifth Circuit's misapplication of precedent,62 1 which established that political parties are prohibited by the
Fifteenth Amendment from conducting a racially discriminatory primary
election. 2 Justice Minton dissented because, like Justice Frankfurter,
he saw no "state action" in this case. 23
In Gilmore v. City of Montgomery,624 a city ordinance and parks
desegregation order made it a misdemeanor "for white and colored
persons to enter upon, visit, use or in any way occupy public parks or
other public houses or public places ...

except those assigned to their

respective races."625 Petitioners, seeking declaratory relief, alleged this
order violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal
protection rights. The petitioners further claimed that the city was
permitting racially segregated schools and other segregated private
groups and clubs to use city parks and recreational facilities under the
auspices of the Y.M.C.A. to which the city had delegated a considerable
amount of "public function."626 The district court granted an injunction, finding that plaintiffs had established "state action," which satisfied
the "under color of" requirement of § 1983.62' The court of appeals
reversed in part, holding that the injunction "impermissibly intruded

was rather "state responsibility," which he described as "that somewhere, somehow, to
some extent, there be an infusion of conduct by officials, panoplied with State power, into
any scheme by which colored citizens are denied voting rights merely because they are
colored." This was eight years before his dissent in Monroe, 313 U.S. 299 (see supra note
419), and he admitted that the case was not an easy one for him. Terry, 345 U.S. at 472.
619. "The evil here is that the State, through the action and abdication of those whom
it has clothed with authority, has permitted white voters to go through a procedure which
predetermines the legally devised primary." Terry, 345 U.S. at 477.
620. At one point he alluded to it in passing. See id. at 481.
621. Notably, Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
622. Terry, 345 U.S. at 481.
623. Id. at 484-94 (Minton, J., dissenting). At one point he referred to Frankfurter's
position, Id. at 485, but misread it. He thought that Frankfurter would say that "state
action" is present if a state official participates in the Jaybird primary. This was not

Frankfurter's opinion, who emphatically gainsaid the presence of "state action" in this case.
Id. at 471.
624. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
625. Id. at 559.
626. Id. at 560.
627. Plaintiffs had brought a § 1983 suit as a separate action. See Smith v. YMCA, 316
F. Supp. 899 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
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upon the freedom of association of citizens who were members of private
groups."62 s
In review of the court of appeals reversal, the Supreme Court decided
that it must determine whether the "city's involvement in the alleged
discriminatory activity of segregated private schools and other private
groups, through its providing recreational facilities, constitutes 'state
action' subject to constitutional limitation. 6 29 The Court could not
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court,
make that determination.
did not attempt to formulate an infallible test for determining "'whether
the State . . . has become significantly involved in private discriminations' so as to constitute state action." 31 Instead, quoting Reitman v.
Mulkey,632 he said that it was the task of the district court upon
remand to make that determination by "sifting facts and weighing
633 One Justice dissentcircumstances (on a case-by-case basis) ...
ed.

63 4

In Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 3' New York State, by the "self-help"
provision of its Uniform Commercial Code, gave warehouse-people the
right to sell property belonging to persons who utilized their services.
Aggrieved persons, naming the warehouse-person, but not public
officials, filed a class action under § 1983 seeking damages, an injunction, and a declaration that such sale would violate the class's due
process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.63 6 After analyzing many of the principles upon which the
Supreme Court has decided "state action" cases and a few others,637

628. Gilmore, 417 U.S. at 565. The court said that "the portion of the District Court's
order prohibiting the mere use of such facilities by any segregated 'private group, club or
organization' is invalid because it was not predicated upon a proper finding of state action."
Id. at 574.
629. Id. at 565-66.
630. Id. at 574. Like Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. 163, the Court recited those "generalized
governmental services" which "do not by their mere provision constitute a showing of state
involvement in invidious discrimination." Gilmore, 417 U.S. at 574.
631. Id.

632. 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
633. Gilmore, 417 U.S. at 574.
634. Id. at 576 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall registered a partial dissent
on the basis that the Court merely rendered an advisory opinion on matters not present.
Id. at 576 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
635. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
636. Id. at 153.
637. To wit: "[Tihat the settlement of disputes between debtors and creditors is not
traditionally an exclusive public function," id. at 161, and that "creditors ... have available
to them historically a far wider number of choices than has one who would be an elected
public official." Id. at 162.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

636

[Vol. 56

the Court held that there was no "state action" in this case.138 It is
only when the state delegates to a private person something that is
historically an exclusive prerogative of the sovereign639 that action 6by
40
the private party pursuant to the delegation becomes "state action."
The Commercial Code provision provides the debtor with rights and
remedies for the redress of wrongs committed by the creditor. 641 This
"system of rights and remedies, recognizing the traditional place of
private arrangements in ordering relationships in the commercial world,
can hardly be said to have delegated to [the warehouse-person] an
exclusive prerogative of the sovereign." 2 The Court added that "the
settlement of disputes between debtors and creditors is not traditionally
an exclusive public function."6 43 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority,6 " said that:
This Court ... has never held that a State's mere acquiescence in a
private action converts that action into that of the State .... "r
Here the State of New York has not compelled the sale of a bailor's
goods, but has merely announced the circumstances under which the
courts will not interfere with a private sale. Indeed, the crux of
is not that the State has acted, but that it has
respondents' complaint
46
refused to act.
The Court specifically noted that its holding in no way impaired the
value of Norwood and Gilmore. 4' Three Justices dissentprecedential
8
ed.

64

638.
639.
640.
641.

Id. at
As an
Id. at
Id. at

166.
example, an election. See id. at 158.
161.
160.

642. Id.

643. Id. at 161.
644. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Powell, Blackmun, Brennan, Rehnquist, and
Stewart.
645. Flagg, 436 U.S. at 164.
646. Id. at 166.
Self-help of the type involved in this case is not significantly different from
creditor remedies generally, whether created by common law or enacted by
legislatures. New York's statute has done nothing more than authorize (and
indeed limit)-without participation by any public official-what [the warehouseman] would tend to do, even in the absence of such authorization, i.e., dispose of
[its customer's] property in order to free up its valuable storage space.
Id. at 163 n.12.
647. Id. at 163.
648. Id. at 166 (Marshall, Stevens, and White, JJ., dissenting). Justice Marshall
dissented on the basis that the Court, in considering that executing on one's property is not
a function of the State, "demonstrates, not for the first time, . . . callous indifference to the
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In Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency, 49
a compact entered into between the states of California and Nevada

created the Tahoe Regional Planning Authority (the "Authority") to
regulate the use of land in the Lake Tahoe region.65 Property owners
sued the Authority under, inter alia, § 1983 seeking monetary and
"equitable" relief and alleging that a land use ordinance promulgated by
the Authority deprived them of the beneficial use of their land.6"' "The
actual implementation of [the Authority], after federal approval was
obtained, depended upon the appointment of governing members and
executives by the two States and their subdivisions152 and upon
mandatory financing secured, by the terms of the Compact, from the
counties."5 3 Those conclusions that the regulation of land use being
traditionally a function performed by local governments5 4 and that
§ 1983 is to be given a liberal construction, 5 ' furnished the Court's
reasons for finding that the Authority acted "under color of" state law
despite the fact that federal approval was required of the interstate
compact. 56 Three Justices partially dissented on the basis of the
case rather than on the substantive issue of
immunity issues in the
6 57
acting "under color of."

realities of life for the poor." Id. at 166 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, with
whom Justices White and Marshall joined, wrote that
[w]hether termed "traditional," "exclusive," or "significant," the state power to
order binding, nonconsensual resolution of a conflict between debtor and creditor
is exactly the sort of power with which the Due Process Clause is concerned. And
the State's delegation of that power to a private party is, accordingly, subject to
due process scrutiny.
Id. at 176.
649. 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
650. The court described its function as "to coordinate and regulate development in the
Basin and to conserve its natural resources." Id. at 394.
651. Id.
652. The actual operation by state appointees being a factor in whether a "state actor"
acts "under color of" was determined again in BrentwoodAcademy, 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
653. Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 399.
654. Id. at 402.
655. Id. at 400.
656. Id. at 402. While the Court did not specifically mention the delegation of state
functions, as did the lower court, see id. at 400, this was obviously a delegation of state
functions case.
657. Id. at 406-09 (Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
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In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 65 former teachers and a vocational
counselor brought a § 1983 action against a private, 59 nonprofit high
school for violation of their First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights in connection with their discharge from employment. The
teachers presumably sought reinstatement.160
Though located on
privately owned property, virtually all of the institution's income was
derived from government funding, it was extensively regulated, had a
contract with a state agency, and it performed a "public function" in
providing education to maladjusted students. 661 Despite these factors,
plaintiffs' discharge was not "state action." 66 2 Just because one of its
activities was a public function did not make the school a "state actor"
when the public function was not a function that could be provided only
by the state.6 3 In this case the state could have provided a school for
maladjusted students, but it did not because it found that the private
institution did a better job. 664 The decisions to discharge its employees, moreover, "were not compelled or even influenced by any state
regulation." 665 In short, "[n]o symbiotic relationship such as existed in
Burton, exists here .... 666 Chief Justice Burger's words emphasize
the Court's rationale:
Here the decisions to discharge the petitioners were not compelled or
even influenced by any state regulation.667 Indeed, in contrast to the
extensive regulation of the school generally, the various regulators
showed relatively little interest in the school's personnel matters. The
most intrusive personnel regulation promulgated by the various
governmental agencies was the requirement that the Committee on
Criminal Justice had the power to approve persons hired as vocational

658. 457 U.S. 830, 831 (1982) (decided the same day as Lugar, 457 U.S. 922, and Blum,
457 U.S. 991).
659. The school is operated by a board of directors, none of whom are public officials
or are chosen by public officials. Id. at 832.
660. The Court's opinion does not reveal the relief sought.
661. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-42. The Court almost summarily rejected the
argument that there was a "symbiotic relationship" between the state and the institution.
Id. at 842-43.
662. Id.
663. Id.
664. A rather difficult concept to grasp without elucidation, which is lacking in Burger's
opinion. West, 457 U.S. 42, is a good example of a "public function," i.e., a physician hired
by a state on a part-time basis to furnish medical services to state prisoners.
665. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841.
666. Id. at 843.
667. This is similar to the holdings in Blum, 457 U.S. 991, and Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S.
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counselors. Such a regulation is not sufficient to make a decision to
discharge, made by private management, state action.668

Two Justices dissented.669
In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,6 ° though the Supreme Court had
previously said that the "state action" requirement of a Fourteenth
Amendment violation and the "under color of" requirement of 42 U.S.C.
was the Supreme Court's first
§ 1983 were virtually the same, 7 ' this 672
in-depth discussion of that relationship.
Respondent had caused petitioner's property to be attached prejudgment pursuant to a Virginia statute. Petitioner filed a § 1983 complaint
seeking damages against the respondent, alleging that the respondent
acted jointly with the state to deprive him of his property without due
process of law.678 Respondent defended on the basis of lack of "state
action" and asserted Flagg Bros. v. Brooks674 as his authority. The
The Supreme Court
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.6 7
disagreed and distinguished Flagg Bros., resulting in a disquisition
concerning the relationship between "state action" and "under color
of."6 76 Without specifically mentioning Justice Frankfurter's dissent
in Monroe,6 77 Justice White, in a rather tautologous majority opin-

668. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841-42.
669. Id. at 844 (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissenting). Justice Marshall, with whom
Justice Brennan agreed, dissented mainly on his conclusion that the following elements
establish: (1) heavy regulation by the State, (2) the school is providing a substitute for
public education, and (3) the school is funded almost entirely by governmental agencies.
Id. at 844-52.
670. 457 U.S. 922 (decided the same day as Rendell.Baker, 457 U.S. 830, and Blum,
457 U.S. 991).
671. See supra note 2.
672. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 924. Of course in 1966, Justice William 0. Douglas, writing
for the Court in Evans, 383 U.S. at 299, said:
What is "private" action and what is "state" action is not always easy to determine
...Conduct that is formally "private" may become so entwined with governmental
policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to
the constitutional limitations placed upon states ... When private individuals or
groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in
nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its
constitutional limitations.
673. The State of Virginia was not made a party to the action. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at
946.
674. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
675. Flagg, 457 U.S. 926.
676. Id. at 926-27.
677. See supra text accompanying notes 432-36.

640

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

ion, 6'8 agreed with Frankfurter's position announced therein to the
effect that there can be no "under color of" (and presumably no "state
action") when the authority of the state is being misused or abused.
Limiting the Court's holding to the "particular context of prejudgment
attachment,"67 9 Justice White, writing the majority opinion, 680 stated
that "petitioner did present a valid cause of action under § 1983 insofar
as he challenged the constitutionality of the Virginia statute; he did not
insofar as he alleged only misuse or abuse of the statute."68 ' Four
Justices dissented.6 82
In National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian,8 3 Jerry Tarkanian, a very successful college basketball coach, facing discipline by his
school upon the recommendation of the NCAA, brought a § 1983 action
against the NCAA for an injunction and damages sustained by him due
The
to alleged deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment rights. 84
Supreme Court, six months after deciding West v. Atkins, 6s ' held that
the NCAA, a private entity, did not act under color of state law when it
recommended discipline of Coach Tarkanian; hence it could discriminate

678. The majority consisted of, in addition to Justice White, Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
679. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939 n.21.
680. The majority consisted of Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Stevens, Marshall, and
White.
681. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942. In his dissent Justice Powell, though grateful, thought
it was "unclear why a private party engages in state action when filing papers seeking an
attachment of property, but not when seeking other relief (e.g., an injunction), or when
summoning police to investigate a suspected crime." See id. at 951 n.8 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
682. Id. at 943-56 (Burger, C.J., Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
Chief Justice Burger wrote a dissenting opinion that "invoking a judicial process, of course,
implicates the State and its officers but does not transform essentially private conduct into
action of the State." Id. at 943 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Powell wrote a lengthy,
stinging dissent. Like Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell took umbrage with the majority
for its holding that any private person can create "state action." Id. at 945 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). He acknowledged that the Sheriff who sequestered petitioner's property
engaged in "state action," but "it does not follow that respondent became a 'state actor'
simply because the Sheriff was." Id. at 949 (Powell, J., dissenting).
In another part of his opinion he said that "our cases have not established that private
'joint participants' with state officials themselves necessarily become state actors." Id. at
948 (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell added that "where the State is not responsible for a
private decision to behave in a certain way, the private action generally cannot be
considered 'state action' within the meaning of our cases." Id. at 949 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined Justice Powell in his dissent.
683. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
684. Id. at 181.
685. 487 U.S. 42 (1988).

2005]

UNDER COLOR OF

641

against him with impunity.6 6 When the University of Nevada at Las
Vegas ("UNLV"), a state institution, notified Tarkanian that he was
being suspended, it did so "under color of" state law.687 The NCAA, on
the other hand, had no governmental powers to facilitate its investigation and could make only recommendations, which could be rejected by
the State.68 8
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court,66 9 said that "decisive conduct"
may be "state action," which may occur "if the State creates the legal
framework governing the conduct ... if it delegates its authority to the
private actor ... or sometimes if it knowingly accepts the benefits
derived from unconstitutional behavior." 90 He added that "even if we
assume that a private monopolist can impose its will on a state agency
by threatened refusal to deal with it, it does not follow that such a
private party is therefore acting under color of state law."69 ' Four
Justices dissented. 9 2
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,693 a construction worker of
African descent sued a construction company in a Louisiana federal
district court for negligently permitting one of the company trucks to
proximately cause his injuries. During jury selection, peremptory
challenges eliminated two persons of African descent, and the final jury
was composed of eleven Caucasians and one person of African descent.
Plaintiff, complaining that defendant's use of peremptory challenges
deprived him of his Fifth Amendment rights and defendant should have
been required to articulate a race-neutral explanation for its two

686. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 198.
687. Id. at 193.
688. Id. at 193-94.
689. The majority consisted of, in addition to Stevens, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Blackman. Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor joined.
690. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 192.
691. Id. at 198-99.
692. Id. at 199 (White, Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting). Justice
White, the author of Lugar, 457 U.S. 922, wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor. Justice White thought that Dennis, 449 U.S. 24,
governed because there as here the "state actor" had no real power to take the action which
deprived plaintiff of his rights. It should be observed that Dennis was decided on an
entirely different rationale than this case. In Dennis the rationale was that the "state
actor" conspired with an employee of the state whereas in this case the rationale is that
the state did not delegate an enforceable "public function." Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 202.
We also wonder whether Justice White's knowledge of the power of the NCAA in the real
world of college athletics had something to do with his position. It should be remembered
that he was an All-American and professional football player before being appointed to the
Bench.
693. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
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peremptories, sought a reversal of his judgment.694 The Supreme
Court, on certiorari, held that the exercise of peremptory challenges in
a discriminatory manner during the trial of a federal case is unconstitutional "state action" under the equal protection component of the Fifth
The Court pointed out that
Amendment's Due Process Clause.69
private litigants, in general, do not act pursuant to any contractual
relationship with the government, but when they participate in the
selection of juries, they "serve an important function within the
Justice
government and act with its substantial assistance." 6
Kennedy wrote:
A traditional function of government is evident here. The peremptory
challenge is used in selecting an entity that is a quintessential
governmental body, having no attributes of a private actor. The jury
exercises the power of the court and of the government that confers the
court's jurisdiction.697
[G]overnmental authority may dominate an activity to such an
extent that its participants must be deemed to act with the authority
of the government and, as a result, be subject to constitutional
constraints.698
Three Justices dissented.6 99

In Georgia v. McCollum,7" the Supreme Court granted certiorari so
that it might answer a question left open in Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co.:"° ' whether the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise

694. Id. at 616-17.
695. Id. at 616.
696. Id. at 627-28. Curiously the Court nowhere in its opinion determined the defense
attorney to be a "state actor."
697. Id. at 624.
698. Id. at 620. The Court ascribed three inquiries as to whether one is a "state actor":
(1) "the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits," (2)
.whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental function," and (3) "whether
the injury is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority." Id.
at 621-22. Justice Byron White in Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941, said that "we have consistently
held that a private party's joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disputed
property is sufficient to characterize that party as a 'state actor' for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment."
699. Id. at 631 (Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor and Scalia, JJ., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. After a review
of several of the cases referred to in this Article, Justice O'Connor equated this case with
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, in seeing the role of an attorney using peremptory challenges not
unlike the role of a public defender representing a client. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 642.
700. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
701. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
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of peremptory challenges.7 °2 Two Caucasians were being tried in
Georgia for aggravated assault upon a person of African descent.
The trial judge denied the State's motion for a ruling prohibiting
defendants from exercising peremptory challenges in a racially
discriminatory manner in violation of the Sixth Amendment and the
Georgia Constitution. The soundness of the trial judge's ruling turned
on whether the criminal defendant's exercise of a peremptory challenge
constituted "state action" for the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court accepted the precedent of Leesville Concrete70 3 to the effect
that "the private party's exercise of peremptory challenges constituted
state action, even though the motive underlying the exercise of the
7 4
peremptory challenge may have been to protect a private interest"
and extended it to the use of peremptory challenges by a defendant in
a criminal trial.
Using words similar to those of Justice Kennedy in Leesville Concrete,
Justice Blackmun wrote that "a criminal defendant is wielding the power
to choose a quintessential governmental body-indeed, the institution of
government on which our judicial system depends."70 5 Two Justices
dissented."'6
In American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan,7 a
§ 1983 action was brought by employees of a school district against
Pennsylvania state officials, the Pennsylvania State Workers' Insurance
Fund, private insurers, self-insured employers, and school districts
alleging that their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were being
violated by defendants' being permitted by state statute to suspend,
without notice, benefits due to disputes about medical treatment
received. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as
damages.70 8 The Supreme Court held that the action was improperly
brought against the private insurers since they were not "state
actors."709
The Court made it clear that there are two prerequisites to recovery
in a § 1983 case: First, the deprivation must be a "constitutional
deprivation," that is, one that is caused by the exercise of some right or

702. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 46.
703. Id. at 48.
704. Id. at 54-55.
705. Id. (referring to a jury).
706. Id. at 62 (Scalia and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist switched
to the majority; Justices O'Connor and Scalia were the two dissenters. They again argued
that the aegis of Polk, 454 U.S. 312, should control. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 62-70.
707. 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
708. Id. at 48.
709. Id. at 58.
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privilege created by (1) the State, (2) a rule of conduct imposed by the
State, or (3) a person for whom the State is responsible. Second, the
offender must be a "state actor."7 10 In this case, because the private
insurers were aware of the state statute, the first prerequisite was met.
The "state actor" requirement, however, was not met. The state statute
in question did not mandate action on the part of the private parties.
It merely gave them the option of withholding benefits in the event of a
dispute rather than having the state make the decision to withhold.71 '
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in Part II of the opinion7" ' that "[t]he
State's decision to allow insurers to withhold payments pending review
can just as easily be seen as state inaction, or more accurately, a
legislative decision not to intervene in a dispute between an insurer and
an employee over whether a particular treatment is reasonable and
necessary."" One Justice dissented."1
In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Ass'n,7" 5 the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association ("TSSAA"), a nonprofit corporation, was recognized by the state as "'providing
standards, rules and regulations for interscholastic competition in the
public schools of Tennessee'" since its incorporation in 1925. Private
schools represented sixteen percent of the TSSAA's membership. Due
to a recruiting violation, the TSSAA suspended Brentwood for two years
and imposed a $3,000 fine upon the school. Brentwood sued TSSAA
under § 1983 for violation of its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights,
presumably to undo the suspension and fine.7" ' The Supreme Court
determined that the TSSAA was a "state actor" based, inter alia, upon
the following facts: (1) eighty-four percent of the TSSAA's membership
was public schools, (2) public school officials, for the most part, control

710. Id. at 50.
711. The court did not explicitly refute what could have been argued, i.e., that when
the state transferred to the private parties its decision-making powers, it made the
transferee a "state actor." It was content to rule that such form of "inaction" (i.e., in
connection with the withholding of benefits) on the part of the state does not make the
transferee a "state actor." Id. at 53.
712. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer joined the Chief
Justice in Part II of the opinion.
713. Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 53.
714. Id. at 63 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, though he agreed with most
of what was written in the majority opinion, dissented from the Court's judgment because
he thought that the question as to whether the insurer was a "state actor" was irrelevant
since the state-appointed decision-makers were the real "state actors." Id. at 64-65
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
715. 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
716. The opinion does not reveal what relief was sought.
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the TSSAA, 717 (3) half of the TSSAAs meetings were held during
school hours, and (4) public schools "largely" provide the TSSAA's
support.7 18
The Court distinguished Tarkanian7 19 on the basis that the wide
diversity of membership relegated the NCAAs relationship to the State
of Nevada as "too insubstantial to ground a state-action claim,"72 °
whereas here the TSSAA was composed exclusively of Tennessee
schools.7 2 1 Justice Souter, writing for the majority,7 22 stated that
"[tihere would be no recognizable Association, legal or tangible, without
the public school officials, who do not merely control but overwhelmingly
perform all but the purely administerial acts by which the Association
exists and functions in practical terms. 7 28 Perhaps wanting to replace

the "interdependence" of Burton7 " and the "symbiotic relationship" of
Moose Lodge, 25 Justice Souter wrote of "entwinement" when he said
that the Court has treated a nominally private entity as a "state actor
when it is 'entwined with governmental policies,' or when government
in [its] management or control."' 26 Four Justices dissentis 'entwined
7
ed.

72

V.

CONCLUSION

From reading the forty Supreme Court decisions analyzed in this
Article one may gain the impression that litigation involving the Civil
Rights Acts is concerned primarily with racially motivated deprivation
of rights in southern states. While a considerable number of the cases
evolved out of deprivation of rights based on race, 2 almost half of
those were from states other than the South. 29 Only two of the

717. This factor is reminiscent of the activities by state-appointed officials concluded
in Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. 391.
718. Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 291.
719. 498 U.S. 179 (1988).
720. Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 297.
721. Id. at 298.
722. In addition to Justice Souter, the majority consisted of Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Ginsburg, and Breyer.
723. Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 300.
724. 365 U.S. 706 (1961).
725. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
726. Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 296.
727. Id. at 305 (Thomas, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
728. Actually nineteen of the forty cases, i.e., forty-eight percent.
729. Lane (Oklahoma); Shelley (the midwest); Monroe (the midwest); Burton
(Delaware); Reitman; (California); and Moose Lodge (Pennsylvania).
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racially motivated cases, moreover, have reached the Court in the past
twenty-nine years.3
Perhaps we can validly observe that while racial discrimination has
not been completely eradicated in this country, its maledictions are
becoming less pronounced.7 31 We have come, if the Supreme Court
decisions are any indication, from the days when almost all of the
modern Civil Rights cases under § 242 and § 1983 were racially involved
to cases concerning the termination of electric services,732 medical
problems,7' 3 3 the treatment of prisoners, 73 4 and the disciplining of

basketball coaches;7 35 all important though not heinous as were the
racially motivated cases.
As to the meaning of "under color of," however, we end where we
began. All we know is that it means the same as "state action," but we
do not have a precise definition of either term from our highest court.
In addition to the lack of clarity in this area of the law, we have a
debate among the Supreme Court Justices on whether "under color of"
is a term reserved for those acts performed by an official of the sovereign
or may it be applied to acts performed by private (non-official) individuals. Justice William 0. Douglas, in Screws v. United States,736 thought
that "under color of" meant in "pretense" of law and that it would cover
acts performed by officials who were acting outside the scope of their
authority and to private (non-official) individuals.737 Justices Owen J.
Roberts, Felix Frankfurter, and Robert H. Jackson disagreed with
Justice Douglas in that case. 3' They thought that "under color of"
was intended to cover only acts performed by officials of the sovereign
acting within their official capacity.73 9

730. Edmonson, 500 U.S. 614 (1991); McCollom, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
731. Anyone who reads Bell v. State of Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), however, will
sadly admit that for almost a hundred years after Appomattox our nation had not been
completely "reconstructed." Hopefully, given time and knowledge, it will be some day;
whether we, the living, will ever see it is open to question.
732. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
733. American Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999); O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563 (1975).
734. Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1981).
735. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 480 U.S. 179 (1987); Brentwood Academy v. T.S.S.A.A., 325
U.S. 91 (1945).
736. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
737. Id. at 111.
738. Id. at 138-39.
739. Id. at 143-44.
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Justices Frankfurter and Jackson expounded further upon their theory
in Williams v. United States. 740 In Monroe v. Pape,74 x Justice Frankfurter wrote a virtual treatise on his position. In 1999 five members of
the Court in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,7 42 (including Justice Stevens
who is presently on the Court) agreed that "under color of" cannot be
applied to "pretense" use of authority.743 Rather recently, in CrawfordEl v. Britton7 " two sitting members of the Court, Justices Scalia and
Thomas, have voiced the same position. This divergence of opinion as
to the meaning of "under color of" is far too profound to be left in limbo.
In an attempt to bring some certainty into the meaning of "under color
of," this Article has separated the cases into those that involve acts of an
official of the sovereign (the "Official Capacity" cases), and those that
involve acts of a non-official (the "Personal Capacity" cases). In the
"Official Capacity" cases it is the sovereign that will be found guilty or
liable.745 In the "Personal Capacity" cases, either an official or a nonofficial may be the participant and have personal liability for his or her
actions.746
The second category divides into five sub-types of cases. In the first
sub-type, if the officials misuse their authority they can be found to have
acted "under color of" law because "under color of" law can be interpreted to mean that one is acting not under the law but under a pretense of
law. In the second sub-type, personal liability is imposed simply because
the defendant was merely following an edict of the sovereign. In the
third sub-type, there is a conspiratorial or "symbiotic" relationship
between the defendant and the sovereign. In the fourth sub-type, the
defendant has received some benefit from the sovereign. In the fifth
sub-type, the defendant has been delegated a "public function," which it
uses to deprive another of a protected right.

740. 341 U.S. 97 (1951). See supra note 424 for reference to the dissent.
741. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See supra text accompanying note 436 for reference to the
dissent.
742. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
743. Id. at 928.
744. 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
745. When the sovereign is sued for its deprivation of rights it is a relatively easy
matter for the court to find "under color of" and "state action," but as was pointed out in
one case considered, Parrattv. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, the plaintiff must be prepared to
prove lack of due process of law. In these Type I cases, the "state actor" might also be
personally liable. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991).
746. Overall, most of the "personal liability" cases are brought under a sub-type II-A
("Abuse/misuse" of authority) or sub-type II-E (the state delegates a "public function" to
the "state actor") basis though eighty percent of the sub-type II-B (state actor merely
follows an edict of the state) cases were racially motivated, whereas none of the sub-type
II-D (the state actor receives a benefit from the State) cases had race as their animus.
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These "personal capacity" catalytic tests are more than just theories
that jurists emote about. They furnish a bridge with which to connect
the individual to the sovereign in order to impose penal or civil penalties
upon the one accused of deprivation of rights. This connection with the
sovereign is necessitated by the fact that there is no constitutional
prohibition against an individual depriving another of his or her rights,
and if the statutes are to be enforced against an individual, the
individual must be found connected to the sovereign in some fashion.747
Though the cases can be categorized, there can be no clear definition
emanating from these fact-specific decisions. Justice Tom Clark has
opined that "[oinly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances [on a
case-by-case basis] can the nonobvious involvement of the State in
private conduct be attributed its true significance."74 s Justice Byron
White has said that it would be an "impossible task" to formulate an
"infallible test for determining whether the State 'in any of its manifestations' has become significantly involved in private discriminations." 749 The Supreme Court has recognized that various tests have
been devised for making that determination 75' but has indicated that
these tests will not replace the "fact-bound" inquiry required.75 '
Hopefully that task will be easier as deprivations of rights decrease. 52

747. See supra text accompanying note 6.
748. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722. Justice Blackmun used
similar wording in Gilmore, 417 U.S. 556, 574.
749. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967).
750. They are the "public function," "state compulsion," "nexus," and "joint action" tests.
See Lugar, 457 U.S. 933, 939.
751. Id.
752. On June 13, 1994, Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous Court (Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas,
and Ginsburg) thought that there was nothing "vague or amorphous" about the obligation
of the California State Labor Commission and others acting "under color of law" to respect
the rights of an employee under the National Labor Relations Act. See Livadas v.
Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994). Hopefully his words were prophetic.

